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For some time now, big data applications have been enabling revolutionary innova-
tion in every aspect of our daily life by taking advantage of tons of data generated
from the interactions of users with technology. Supported by machine learning and
unprecedented computation capabilities, different entities are capable of efficiently
exploiting such data to obtain significant utility. However, since personal information
is involved, these practices raise serious privacy concerns.
Although multiple privacy protection mechanisms have been proposed, there are
some challenges that need to be addressed for these mechanisms to be adopted in
practice, i.e., to be “usable” beyond the privacy guarantee offered. To start, the real
impact of privacy protection mechanisms on data utility is not clear, thus an empirical
evaluation of such impact is crucial.
Moreover, since privacy is commonly obtained through the perturbation of large
data sets, usable privacy technologies may require not only preservation of data utility
but also efficient algorithms in terms of computation speed. Satisfying both require-
ments is key to encourage the adoption of privacy initiatives.
Although considerable effort has been devoted to design less “destructive” privacy
mechanisms, the utility metrics employed may not be appropriate, thus the wellness
of such mechanisms would be incorrectly measured. On the other hand, despite the
advent of big data, more efficient approaches are not being considered. Not complying
with the requirements of current applications may hinder the adoption of privacy
technologies.
In the first part of this thesis, we address the problem of measuring the effect of
k-anonymous microaggregation on the empirical utility of microdata. We quantify
vi
utility accordingly as the accuracy of classification models learned from microaggre-
gated data, evaluated over original test data. Our experiments show that the impact
of the de facto microaggregation standard on the performance of machine-learning al-
gorithms is often minor for a variety of data sets. Furthermore, experimental evidence
suggests that the traditional measure of distortion in the community of microdata
anonymization may be inappropriate for evaluating the utility of microaggregated
data.
Secondly, we address the problem of preserving the empirical utility of data. By
transforming the original data records to a different data space, our approach, based
on linear discriminant analysis, enables k-anonymous microaggregation to be adapted
to the application domain of data. To do this, first, data is rotated (projected)
towards the direction of maximum discrimination and, second, scaled in this direction,
penalizing distortion across the classification threshold. As a result, data utility
is preserved in terms of the accuracy of machine learned models for a number of
standardized data sets.
Afterwards, we propose a mechanism to reduce the running time for the k-anony-
mous microaggregation algorithm. This is obtained by simplifying the internal op-
erations of the original algorithm. Through extensive experimentation over multiple
data sets, we show that the new algorithm gets significantly faster. Interestingly, this
remarkable speedup factor is achieved with no additional loss of data utility.
Finally, in a more applied effort, we propose a data privacy tool to protect privacy
of individuals and organizations by anonymizing sensitive data included in security
logs. We design different anonymization mechanisms to then implement them accord-
ing to the definition of a privacy policy. We adapt said approach to the context of
an EU project whose aim is to build a unified security framework. Since this frame-
work collects and processes security-related data (logs, reports, events) from multiple
devices of critical infrastructures, our work is devoted to protect privacy there by
integrating our anonymization approach.
vii
Acknowledgments
A mis padres por su amor y apoyo siempre. A mi esposo e hijo por su comprensión,
paciencia y dedicación.
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In present times, sophisticated and powerful information systems are being imple-
mented to achieve an unprecedented level of intelligent behavior and personalization.
In a wide variety of fields, more utility can be mined from data to unveil qualitatively
superior insight into challenges and opportunities that may otherwise remain undis-
covered [3, 4]. This is now possible thanks to the combination of automatic learning
algorithms and the increasing availability of data. Namely, vast quantities of detailed
information, often referred to as big data, are made available to more sophisticated
and powerful information systems.
Part of such sophistication involves machine-learning algorithms that are being
developed to automatically discover useful “anomalies”, e.g., in medicine, but they
still require vast amounts of data to achieve actionable accuracy. Combining such
technologies with big data may lead to truly remarkable scientific feats such as a better
cancer detection ([5, 6]). In fact, human proficiency is being combined with machine-
based mechanisms to provide augmented intelligence from large-scale databases.
An unquestionable product of this revolution is personalization. By adapting
services to the specific needs of users, personalization has brought numerous benefits
for people and big profits for companies. One of the reasons of its popularity has
to do with the effectiveness of personalized services. In fact, personalization may
be so accurate that it is currently applied to offer precision medicine or product
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
recommendation. Note that this is possible since there is a lot of personal information
within the large amounts of data processed.
Consequently, the revolutionary advances accomplished in the big data era poses
equally serious privacy risks for users. Although identifiers are typically suppressed
from shared or published data, some demographic attributes, when combined, can still
be used to re-identify individuals ([7–9]). Unfortunately, this re-identification might
enable privacy attackers to link the identity of subjects with their corresponding
sensitive attributes. Said disclosure might lead to harmful attitudes against subjects,
e.g., discrimination [10].
Anonymization is commonly used to reduce this disclosure risk by perturbing de-
mographic attributes to de-identify records. The privacy models enforced through
user data perturbation, e.g., k-anonymity [7, 11] or ε-differential privacy ([12]), are
usually conditioned by a privacy parameter that defines an upper bound on the re-
identification risk. However, in practice, other parameters such as data utility and
mechanism usability convolute the task of protecting privacy. Evidently, data pertur-
bation comes at the cost of some loss in data utility. Additionally, finding a balance
between privacy and utility, when big data is involved, might turn private data analy-
sis unfeasible or unusable for some applications where, e.g., mechanisms must execute
in a reasonable amount of time despite the size of data.
These penalties discourage the adoption of privacy protection so it is important
to tackle them. First, an empirical metric of utility would help to determine the
real impact of anonymization on the utility of data. Since said impact is relative
to the application domain of data, its magnitude probably should be measured in
similar terms. Second, preserving data utility while protecting privacy is another
pending task. This is, in fact, the most valued parameter by an industry whose
revenues are based on the exploitation of data. However, computational cost may be
a metric as important, given the demanding requirements of current web applications.
Unfortunately, providing privacy generates more distortion, which implies less data
utility, while preserving utility usually entails more computing time. Addressing these
issues is crucial for an accurate performance analysis of protection mechanisms and
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it is fundamental for designing better approaches or choosing the best according to
the context.
In this line, many privacy enhancing technologies have been proposed in the liter-
ature but there is not a consensus with respect, e.g., to the way to measure empirical
utility. Moreover, these approaches include preserving data utility, but at a signifi-
cant cost in computational cost. And, although some of them aim at reducing the
execution time of privacy protection algorithms, the price in terms of distortion is
high.
In order to have privacy implemented in practice, it is necessary to face this
compromise.
1.1 Objectives
In this dissertation we tackle three main objectives. Firstly, we address the issue
of evaluating the real impact of privacy protection on the empirical utility of data;
first by performing a systematic study of a standard algorithm; and, secondly, ex-
tending this analysis to other, related, mechanisms. We use the accuracy of models
learned from perturbed data as utility metric of privacy protection algorithms. On
the other hand, we aim at tackling the problem of preserving utility when applying
data-perturbative mechanisms. We address this problem by using a machine learning
strategy to adapt the privacy protection mechanism to the application domain of data.
Finally, we address the issue of computational cost of protection algorithms. For this,
we resort to strategies of simplification to speed up their execution, particularly on
large data sets.
The objectives of this thesis may be more precisely described as follows:
• Impact on empirical data utility. We systematically evaluate the impact of
k-anonymous microaggregation on the empirical utility of data. To capture the
practical degradation of data utility, we use a metric derived from a popular
application domain of data: machine learning. To start, we evaluate the de
facto microaggregation algorithm and then other approaches. Different scenar-
ios are tested, including multiple machine learning algorithms and data sets, to
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determine how data is affected and whether popular metrics are able to predict
such impact.
• Preservation of data utility. We design a mechanism to preserve data utility
empirically when a data-perturbative algorithm is applied. This mechanism
is based on a machine learning technique to enable privacy protection to be
adapted to this application domain of data. We try that this effort does not
imply an increase in the execution time.
• Runtime reduction. We propose and evaluate strategies to significantly re-
duce the running time for k-anonymous microaggregation. This involves tuning
the operations of the privacy protection algorithm to reduce its complexity. Also
in this case, we concentrate on preventing additional distortion as a consequence
of these approaches.
• As part of our collaboration on a European project, we describe the conception
of a privacy protection tool oriented to anonymize cibersecurity data in critical
infrastructures. We address the specific challenges of providing privacy in a
context where unstructured data is involved.
1.2 Summary of contributions
Next, we give an overview of the major contributions of this dissertation.
• We investigate the impact on the performance of machine-learning tasks caused
by data perturbation in the k-anonymous microaggregation process. We apply
a rigorous methodology for evaluating the specific impact of microaggregated
data on machine-learning tasks. Our methodology uses two standard measures
of performance in machine learning and allow for the statistical dependence
among quasi-identifiers. We conduct an extensive, thorough evaluation of a
wide range of machine-learning algorithms amply used in classification tasks.
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• Based on the methodology aforementioned, we evaluate the performance of
other k-anonymous microaggregation techniques in terms of the loss in clas-
sification accuracy of the machine-learned models built from modified data.
Extensive experimentation on four data sets allows us to compare the utility
guarantees provided by the most popular microaggregation algorithms.
• We propose and analyze an anonymization method that draws upon a machine
learning technique, with the aim of preserving the empirical utility of data. By
transforming the original data records to a different data space, this technique
enables k-anonymous microaggregation to adapt its operation to the application
domain of data. To do this, the representation of data is changed. Interestingly,
data utility is preserved without a price in running time.
• We develop five strategies to simplify the internal operations of the maximum
distance to average vector algorithm, the de facto microaggregation standard.
For the sake of its usability in large-scale databases, they, e.g., reduce the num-
ber of operations necessary to compute distances. Also, the complexity of sort-
ing operations gets reduced. Through extensive experimentation over multiple
data sets, we show that the new algorithm gets significantly faster. We get
resulting algorithm four times faster than the original microaggregation mech-
anism. This remarkable speedup factor is achieved, literally, with no additional
cost in terms of data utility, i.e., it does not incur greater information loss.
• Finally, we build a privacy preserving tool for obfuscating sensitive data from se-
curity logs to protect the privacy of the involved entities and individuals. In the
context of the CIPSEC European project [13], our proposal includes a method-
ology to identify and perturb unstructured data generated by a cibersecurity
system.
1.3 Related publications
Most of the research results presented in this dissertation have been published in
journals. In this section we provide a list of such publications, together with their
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bibliographic information. Further, we include other complementary articles that are
not directly related with the research topic of this thesis, but in which the author has
participated while performing her doctoral studies.
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the regulation of personal data distribution in online advertising platforms,”
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 82, pp. 13–29, June
2019. ISSN: 0140-3664. Impact factor 2019: 4.201 [19].
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3. J. Estrada-Jiménez, J. Parra-Arnau, A. Rodŕıguez-Hoyos, and J. Forné, “Mea-
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1.4 Outline of this thesis
The structure of this dissertation is in line with the research objectives defined in Sec.
1.1.
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Chapter 2 describes some of the privacy risks derived from the era of big data
as well as some privacy protection mechanisms proposed in the literature, but par-
ticularly k-anonymous microaggregation. Relevant concepts regarding the impact of
privacy protection on data utility are also reviewed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 presents a systematic evaluation of the impact of MDAV, the de facto
standard k-anonymous microaggregation, on the empirical utility of data. This
methodology is also used in the following two chapters.
Chapter 4 follows a similar evaluation approach of k-anonymous microaggregation,
but more algorithms are considered with the aim of detecting particular strategies
that might preserve empirical data utility.
Afterwards, Chapter 5 proposes a mechanism to preserve empirical data utility
when applying k-anonymous microaggregation. In this chapter we describe how we
apply a machine learning technique to adapt the microaggregation process to the
application domain of data.
Chapter 6 presents an approach to accelerate the execution of k-anonymous mi-
croaggregation for its application on large-scale data sets.
Lastly, Chapter 7 focuses on the design and implementation of a privacy protection
tool for a system managing the security logs of critical infrastructures.
Chapter 2
Background and related work
2.1 Privacy issues in the era of big data
The exponential progress of computing is evident, not only in terms of capacity,
including processing or storage, but also in terms of cost. Every five years computers
become roughly 10 times more powerful (per constant dollar).
Such trend concurs these days with an equally exponential growth of data gener-
ation. Through an ubiquitous telecommunications infrastructure, full of sensors and
activity monitors, millions of Internet users enable a massive collection of data, in-
cluding theirs. But this is not only triggered by users browsing the Web; interactions
of users with any single entity (hospitals, banks, social networks, Internet providers,
etc.) are susceptible to feed big data.
The availability of big data and the capacity to process it have had a revolutionary
impact on the world. Equivalently to a human’s deeper observation, exploiting more
data would not only enable us to “see” more but new, better, and different data
[6]. In fact, as argued in [3], a massive wealth of data may significantly improve
the effectiveness of a machine-learning algorithm to the point of turning a hopeless
computer model into an expert system.
As expected, a lot of critical applications of big data have proved its positive
impact, specially with the emergence of machine learning. One of such applications
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has to do with health, where machine learning applied to large data sets may en-
able, e.g., the detection of subtle effects of some medicines, or even the personalized
treatment of a given disease. Namely, based on big data, precision medicine could be
implemented to identify which approaches will be effective for which patients based
on genetic, environmental, and lifestyle factors.
Although other more commercial applications of big data are supporting billionaire
businesses, including online advertising, currently, information is also raw material for
other efforts such as scientific research or demographic studies. Due to the intrinsic
value of data, currently, any information collected is expected to be released to some
point and to some extent with the aim of being exploited.
The personalized nature of most big data applications that users consume implies
that tons of personal information are required to get effectiveness. That is, the more
data items are processed about users, the more accurate personalization services will
be (i.e., the more utility could be extracted from information). Said data items might
involve several kind of attributes that characterize users in a given context.
In addition, in the current era of big data, information flows involve several entities
from different domains interested in extracting as much utility as possible. In fact,
the means to process data have become so accessible that even small startups could
actively participate in this revolution.
Given the multiple benefits of processing data, its application has spread to all
areas and hundreds of services have been implemented to take advantage of it. Con-
sequently, an intense exchange of (personal) information among entities has arisen,
which has given rise to a very complex scenario where utility has always been the
priority.
This complexity and the indiscriminate exploitation of personal data have lead
to serious privacy concerns. Moreover, such a crowded environment has made data
more prone to be shared, even openly, among third-parties. Thus, potential malicious
“observers” could take advantage of sensitive information encoded within released
data.
Unfortunately, the high speed of transactions when data is processed along with
the real-time requirements of current web applications have left very little room for
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facing privacy issues. In particular, the tight dependence of these applications on
data discourages the implementation of privacy protection technologies that may
significantly reduce its utility and, thus, the resulting revenues.
The issue, in this context, is that intended recipients of information are not fully
trusted, thus conventional mechanisms such as confidentiality through cryptography
are not suitable. Data is required to be usable (accessible, at some extent) while some
protection for user privacy is provided, i.e., two opposing objectives.
A first approach to protect the privacy of individuals involves suppressing their
identifiers, e.g., names, social security numbers, while releasing the rest of attributes.
This way, the link between the subject and potential sensitive information, e.g., re-
ligion, income or political preference, is apparently broken. However, this strategy
may not be enough to protect privacy. It was proven in [23] that three supposedly
innocuous attributes (date of birth, gender and 5-digit ZIP code) were enough to
unequivocally identify an 87% of the population in the United States in 1990.
Due to the discriminative potential of a few combined demographic attributes,
more sophisticated approaches have been proposed to obscure the identity of the
subjects represented in a released data set. Since less needs to be learned about users
to be anonymized, said approaches usually require distorting the data. Sadly, such
distortion of data implies reducing its utility.
Measuring the impact of privacy protection mechanisms on data utility is vital to
determine their suitability in practice. If a mechanism is too destructive, it will not
be applied on the industry, no matter how well it behaves in theoretical terms. Thus,
empirical metrics to asses the expected degradation of utility are also necessary.
In practice, it is evident that the utility of data is increasingly being obtained
through the implementation of machine learning algorithms. By extracting intrinsic
macrotrends from available data, these algorithms are being used massively to build
models that predict outcomes from new data. Being these models the paradigm of
data utility extraction, their performance parameters might be interesting indicators
when measuring resulting data utility after applying distorting mechanisms.
Finally, in addition to data utility, computational complexity of privacy protection
mechanisms is key to have usable privacy. Especially with the advent of big data and
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the real-time requirements of web applications, data processing algorithms have to be
faster than ever to satisfy such requirements. Thus, optimizing their implementation
could be a great incentive for the adoption of privacy enhancing initiatives.
2.1.1 Data release and attacker models
When analyzing data privacy,it is important to define how data about individuals
is represented. Standardizing such representation along with establishing privacy
and utility metrics enables the construction of a common framework where different
protection approaches are suitable to be evaluated and compared.
In general, privacy protection is applied on databases carrying information about
individual respondents, e.g., from a survey or a census. The resulting databases
(also known as microdata sets) contain a set of attributes that may be classified into
identifiers, quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes.
Firstly, identifiers, such as full names or medical record numbers, can single out in-
dividuals from a data set, so are commonly removed in order to preserve the anonym-
ity of respondents. Secondly, quasi-identifiers may include demographic attributes
such as age, gender, address, or physical features, which combined and linked with
other external information can be used to reidentify respondents [8, 9, 23]. Finally, a
data set may contain confidential attributes with sensitive information on the respon-
dents, such as salary, health condition, and religion. These sensitive attributes might
be easily linked to the subjects to whom the disclosed information corresponds if
quasi-identifiers are not adequately obfuscated; said disclosure might lead to discrim-
ination, retaliation, and blackmail [10]. In Fig. 2.1, the table on the left illustrates
an example of this representation and the different types of attributes here described.
With the aim of protecting privacy, then, only quasi-identifiers and confidential
attributes should be released. Confidential attributes could be released as is since the
link between them and the subject is supposed to be broken by the suppression of
identifiers. However, quasi-identifiers, given its reidentification potential, have to be
carefully obfuscated while preserving some of its utility.








Alice Adams 32 1 94024 45 K Yes
Bob Brown 34 0 94305 35 K Yes
Chloe Carter 33 0 94024 15 K No
Dave Diaz 43 0 90210 55 K Yes
Eve Ellis 47 1 90210 70 K Yes
Frank Fisher 45 1 90213 60 K Yes








33 0.33 94*** 45 K Yes
33 0.33 94*** 35 K Yes
33 0.33 94*** 15 K No
45 0.67 9021* 55 K Yes
45 0.67 9021* 70 K Yes














Figure 2.1: Example of k-anonymous microaggregation of published data with k=3. Quasi-identifiers
in the left table are anonymized on the right.
2.2 Privacy protection through k-anonymous mi-
croaggregation
2.2.1 Statistical disclosure control
Beyond the mere suppression of subjects’ identifiers, statistical disclosure control
(SDC) aims to allow useful inferences about subpopulations from a microdata set
while at the same time protecting the privacy of the subjects who contributed their
data.
Microdata are database tables whose records carry data concerning individual
subjects. The typical scenario in microdata SDC is a data curator holding the original
data set and perturbing the so-called quasi-identifier attributes (i.e., attributes that,
in combination, may be linked with external information to reidentify individuals in
the data set). The goal is to keep disclosure risk as low as possible, while ensuring
that only useful statistics or trends are learned by the recipients of data. One of the
most common strategies to keep this risk under control is the “privacy first” approach.
Here, the data curator enforces a privacy model, which usually depends on a privacy
parameter, to ensure an upper bound on the re-identification risk.
Some of the best-known privacy models comprise k-anonymity [11, 23] and ε-
differential privacy [12].
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Privacy models rely on a variety of anonymization mechanisms, the common de-
nominator binding all them is data perturbation. Essentially, all such mechanisms
modify the original data set to guarantee the chosen privacy model, inevitably at the
cost of some loss in data utility [24]. Evidently, a balance between privacy and utility
should be found so that protected data are useful in real practice, that is, they ap-
proximate well the original data. However, in a big data domain, privacy protection
also requires mechanisms to execute in a reasonable amount of time, despite the size
of the data.
Examples of privacy protection approaches include microaggregation, suppression,
generalization and noise addition. Among them, k-anonymous microaggregation is a
high-utility approach.
2.2.2 k-Anonymity
k-Anonymity guarantees the privacy of an individual by making her quasi-identifying
attributes indistinguishable from those of other k − 1 individuals in a microdata set.
More specifically, k-anonymity is a privacy model that guarantees that each tuple of
quasi-identifying values is identically shared by at least k records in a data set.
Thus, rather than making the original table available, a perturbed version of
quasi-identifiers is published where aggregated records of quasi-identifying values are
replaced by a common representative tuple. If every tuple shares quasi-identifying
values with at least k records, the data set is considered k-anonymous [23].
Figure 2.1 depicts how a data set is transformed to satisfy k-anonymity. This way,
a perturbed, more private, version of a data set is obtained to be published instead of
the original one. In the figure, the original data set combines attributes common in
census and medical surveys. It has three quasi-identifiers: age, marital status and ZIP
code; and two confidential attributes: annual salary and type-2 diabetes condition.
The figure at hand shows how, in order to preserve the privacy of respondents, k-
anonymity is enforced by applying perturbation to quasi-identifiers. The technique
applied here is called microaggregation. The result is a microaggregated data set that
may prevent reidentification attacks.
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Figure 2.2: Block diagram of k-anonymous microaggregation as a two-step process [1].
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the process of k-anonymous microaggregation as a minimum-distortion
quantizer design problem [1].
2.2.3 k-Anonymous microaggregation
Microaggregation is a technique aimed to protect the privacy of those individuals
whose personal records are included in a released microdata set. With microaggrega-
tion, distortion is applied to quasi-identifying attributes to satisfy the k-anonymity
privacy model [11, 23]. The original formulation of k-anonymity as a privacy criterion
was modified into the microaggregation-based approach in [25–28].
In Fig. 2.2, a block diagram describes microaggregation as a two-step process
including microcell assignment and centroid assignment. Accordingly, each record (its
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quasi-identifying tuple) is first grouped in a cluster with other k − 1 records. Then,
within each cluster of size k, a centroid, representative of such cluster, is calculated
and assigned to each record. The version released of the data set involves the values
of the centroids calculated for each quasi-identifying tuple.
This process is graphically illustrated in Fig. 2.3. If tuples of quasi-identifiers
in a data set could be represented as points in the Euclidean space, k-anonymous
microaggregation would consist in partitioning these points in cells of size k, and
quantizing each cell and its elements with a representative point. Perturbed key
attributes would be characterized by the set of representative points.
2.2.4 Maximum distance to average vector
The maximum distance to average vector algorithm (MDAV) is the de facto standard
for numerical microaggregation. It was proposed in [29] as a practical evolution of a
multivariate fixed-size microaggregation method and conceived in [26]. We provide,
in Algorithm 1, a simplified version of that given in [27] and termed “MDAV generic”.
Seen a data set as a list of points in IRn, MDAV is an iterative process that starts
by finding the centroid C (calculated as the mean) of the points not yet assigned
to a microcell. Then, points P and Q are found as the furthest point from C and
the furthest point from P, respectively. Two corresponding microcells are built by
grouping P and Q with their k − 1 nearest points. This process is repeated while 2k
points or more in the data set remain to be assigned to microcells.
Finally, to be released, the data set is reconstructed replacing the quasi-identifying
values of each record with the centroid of the microcell they belong to. This centroid
is calculated as the mean of the quasi-identifiers of the microcell.
2.2.5 Reconstruction mechanisms
The way of representing records for each resulting microcell is also important to
preserve the utility of data. For MDAV, when having numerical microdata, we have
chose to use the average of the quasi-identifying tuples as centroid and, thus, as
representative tuple.
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j=1 .Anonymity parameter k, quasi-ID portion (xj)
n
j=1 of a data set
of n records
output q .Assignment function from records to microcells j 7→ q(j)
1: while 2k points or more in the data set remain to be assigned to microcells do
2: find the centroid (average) C of those remaining points
3: find the furthest point P from the centroid C, and the furthest point Q from P
4: select and group the k − 1 nearest points to P , along with P itself, into a microcell, and do
the same with the k − 1 nearest points to Q
5: remove the two microcells just formed from the data set
6: if there are k to 2k − 1 points left then
7: form a microcell with those and finish
8: else .At most k − 1 points left, not enough for a new microcell
9: adjoin any remaining points to the last microcell .Typically nearest microcell
However, besides numerical microaggregation, other anonymization mechanisms
can be used to implement data perturbation. These mechanisms include suppression,
generalization and noise addition. Those could be used indistinctly, depending on
the type of data (e.g., numerical, categorical, ordinal, string), and on its expected
utility. In our work, we mostly deal with numerical data although for some data sets
we transform some textual or ordinal to numerical attributes.
2.2.6 Other privacy criteria
Although k-anonymity is a very popular privacy criterion, it is not flawless. Since the
criterion strictly operates with quasi-identifying attributes, the statistical properties
of confidential attributes (and thus their disclosure potential), both in the data set
and in the entire population, are neglected. In general, k-anonymity overlooks the
knowledge a potential attacker may already have or obtain about the data set, giving
rise to similarity, skewness or background-knowledge attacks [30–32].
In spite of its shortcomings, the application of k-anonymous microaggregation
does not only concern the publication of databases but also some variants thereof like
search engine querying, online data collection and data streaming [33–35].
Additional criteria have been proposed that refine k-anonymity and prevent some
of the above-mentioned attacks. The former, p-sensitive [36, 37], requires that each
group of k-anonymized records contains at least p different values of each confidential
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attribute. In the same but broader spirit, l-diversity proposes that each group have
at least l well-represented confidential values. None of these criteria assures complete
protection against skewness attacks, nor against similarity attacks when confidential
attributes within a group are semantically similar.
Other privacy criteria dealing with similarity and skewness attacks pose require-
ments in the distribution of confidential attributes within groups. The aim is that
confidential attributes in each group of anonymized records are stratified according
to their distribution in the original data set. Depending on the discrepancy allowed
between the within-cluster and overall distributions, these privacy criteria yield t-
closeness [38], δ-disclosure [39], and average privacy risk [31, 40].
To cope with the NP-hardness of multivariate microaggregation, several heuristic
algorithms have been proposed. These algorithms can be classified as fixed-size and
variable-size. Among the former ones, we find the maximum distance [26] (MD)
and its variation, maximum distance to average vector [26, 27] (MDAV). Variable-size
algorithms include, on the other hand, the µ-Approx [28], the minimum spanning tree
[41] (MST), the variable MDAV [42] (V-MDAV) and the two-fixed reference points
algorithms (TFRP).
In general, the implementations of microaggregation have been oriented to reduce
the inherent information loss [43–45] due to perturbation, which commonly derives
in more sophisticated and significantly costlier implementations in terms of compu-
tational time [1].
2.3 Impact of microaggregation on data utility
k-Anonymous microaggregation, as any data perturbation mechanism, implies dis-
tortion or information loss on the data since original data is modified. Measuring
such impact is fundamental for assessing the performance of this and other privacy
protection mechanisms.
2.3 IMPACT OF MICROAGGREGATION ON DATA UTILITY 19
2.3.1 A syntactic metric based on mean squared error
The usual criterion to quantify the distortion of microaggregated data is the mean-
squared error (MSE) for numerical quasi-identifying attributes representable as points




‖xj − x̂j‖2 ,
where n is the number of records of the data set, m is the number of attributes of
each record, xj ∈ Rm is the jth record, and x̂j is the tuple representative of the jth
record.
As can be seen, MSE measures the numerical variation of records after data pertur-
bation is applied. Although such variation may provide an idea about the magnitude
of utility degradation, it does not consider the global macrotrends within the data
set and, more important, neglects the application domain of data where its utility
is exploited. This is the reason why we refer to MSE, or distortion, as a syntactic
measure of data utility.
2.3.2 Machine learning parameters as a semantic metric
While MSE, as a measure of data distortion, is the general metric of the degrada-
tion of data utility after microaggregation, probably, other more practical metrics are
required to evaluate the real impact of this privacy protection mechanism. A more
empirical approach necessarily involves the application domain of data, i.e., the pro-
cess by which utility is extracted in practice. Besides, it is reasonable to think about
adapting privacy protection mechanisms to the application domain of data such that
more utility is preserved while offering similar levels of privacy.
Undoubtedly, one of the most common ways of data exploitation currently is
machine learning. Learning algorithms are widely used to build models (from data)
capable of predicting an outcome when applied to new data.
In an effort to tailor anonymization mechanisms to the application domain of
data (e.g., building classifiers to predict someone’s health condition), some previous
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research work has used empirical utility metrics. One of such metrics is the accuracy
of machine-learned macrotrends built using anonymized data.
The logic is simple: a learning model built with perturbed data would be less
accurate than another built with original data. Accordingly, a higher degree of
anonymization would result in less accurate models. Surprisingly, to the best of our
knowledge, this metric has not been used to systematically evaluate microaggrega-
tion-based anonymization algorithms, but other anonymization algorithms based on
generalization and suppression of records, such as Incognito, Mondrian and DataFly.
In previous work, classification accuracy has been used to evaluate the utility of
(or, equivalently, the distortion introduced to) anonymized data, just to compare the
performance of adapted classifiers or anonymization mechanisms. One of these works
is [46], where the effects of four microaggregation algorithms on the estimation of
a linear regression is compared, when solely applied to simulated data sets. Other
works propose improvements on machine learning algorithms and methodologies, to
obtain higher utility (classification accuracy) from anonymized data. This is the case
of [47], where the authors develop a method to increase the level of utility obtained
from support vector machine (SVM) and k-nearest neighbor (kNN) machine learning
algorithms, when data are anonymized with the DataFly algorithm. By feeding these
algorithms with statistics from original data, in addition to anonymized data, greater
utility ensues from the latter. In the same line, [48] describes an adjustment to
logistic regression that provides differential privacy [12]. Furthermore, decision tree
learning methods are developed in [49] and [50] that enforce l-diversity and differential
privacy, respectively, as privacy criteria and whose accuracy levels approach those of
a non-private decision tree. Using a different focus, [51] and [52] address the privacy
risk resulting from the release of SVM and the anonymized data. Privacy preserving
versions of SVM are proposed and their classification accuracies are used to compare
them with the original SVM.
A great deal of research has also investigated adaptations of anonymization algo-
rithms that generate private data of “higher quality”. In that context, the utility of
anonymized data is evaluated in terms of classification accuracy of machine learning
models [53], [54], and [55]. The cited works rely on generalization and suppression as
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perturbation techniques and include preprocessing steps such as selective anonymiza-
tion of attributes, to adapt the released data to machine learning applications, and
hence preserve their utility. On the other hand, [56] proposes publishing synthetic
microdata generated from differentially private models applied on original data. For
that, machine learning techniques are integrated to improve utility.
Ironically, although enhancements in the utility of anonymized data are reported,
it is not clear what the overall impact of original anonymizing mechanisms in the
first place is. Some approaches do attempt to evaluate the tradeoff between privacy
gain and information loss (measured as accuracy reduction) due to anonymization.
However, various considerations should be done for such evaluation. To start, there
is a variety of anonymization algorithms. For example, [57] focuses on a proprietary
anonymization algorithm whereas [58] examines a non-standard one.
Other caveat is the variable application domain of the data. While classification is
the most popular workload for anonymized data, machine learning algorithms would
perform differently depending on the particular data set used, so the utility would
vary accordingly. This also applies to the number of records, or the size of the data
set, which may affect the performance of anonymization algorithms, e.g., when k-
anonymity is applied, a given value of k shall affect the utility of small data sets more
than the utility of bigger ones.
A last limitation has to do with the baselines to measure privacy gain and utility
loss. Utility, measured as the accuracy of machine learning models, reaches its lower
bound when all the key attributes are discarded; or, for k-anonymity, when k equals
the number of records of the data set. Utility’s upper bound is attained when no
anonymization is applied(a).
Even in this variable scenario, one thing is certain about how machine-learned
trends are affected by anonymization: simultaneously satisfying various privacy cri-
teria, e.g., k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness, may make the data completely
useless, as reported by [39], a study where not only syntactic but also semantic re-
quirements of privacy are evaluated. Those privacy criteria, together with differential
privacy, are out of the scope of this work, since our target application is that of
(a)Further considerations regarding baseline performance can be found in [59].
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data release for general statistical analysis with a focus on data utility. Recall that
differential privacy is conceived for online querying on predefined computations, and
that in general it imposes stringent restrictions, both in terms of usability and data
utility. Those restrictions, introductorily explained also in [60], render it useless for
our purposes.
The review of the state of the art in this section has been conducted from a strictly
technological perspective. Legal and socioeconomic aspects are covered, for instance,
in [61, 62]. Table 2.1 summarizes some of the main contributions where machine
learning performance parameters are used to measure the utility degradation of data
after applying privacy protection mechanisms.
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2.4 Impact of microaggregation on data usability
Although the extraction and preservation of data utility are certainly important when
designing applications either to exploit or protect data, there are other requirements to
make sure such applications are suitable in practice. Evidently, such requirements are
commonly inherited from the technological applications to which privacy protection
mechanisms support.
Although data is the new oil in the big data era, applications of big data are
currently possible just because the algorithms that process it can be executed much
faster than in the past. However, the execution time is still a bottleneck for some
highly demanding applications, which does not favor the implementation of further
processing privacy routines. Consequently, we could say that accelerating the exe-
cution of privacy protection mechanisms is a fundamental approach to encourage its
adoption in the era of big data.
Recent works have shown to follow approaches to increase the efficiency of pri-
vacy protection algorithms, not only in terms of runtime [63–65], but also in terms of
resulting data utility. For instance, [41] developed an efficient clustering mechanism
to deal with large databases while preserving the data utility through a partitioning
method of a modified minimum spanning tree. In the same line, [66] designed an
efficient and effective microaggregation mechanism based on calculating the distance
among records as the mutual information (entropy) among them. Finally, [67] in-
troduced fast data-oriented microaggregation (FDM), a method capable of getting
multiple protected versions of a large data set (for different values of k) in a single
load.
Note that all these approaches offer a reduction of runtime for privacy protection
mechanisms at a cost in data distortion. Thus, there is another trade off that should
be actively tacked to guarantee that privacy protection can be implemented in real
scenarios.
Chapter 3
Impact of MDAV on the empirical
utility of data
3.1 Introduction
The permanent and increasing interactions of people (both conscious and uncon-
scious) with the Internet trigger the disclosure of tons of personal data. Besides, as
discussed in Sec. 2.1, the great utility that can be extracted from data encourages its
exploitation by thousands of third-parties. Naturally, serious privacy concerns arise
from such practice.
To face the potential privacy threats, several protection mechanisms have been
proposed in the literature; one of them is k-anonymous microaggregation, whose basic
elements were described in 2.2.3 . Although the level of privacy protection it offers
is clearly defined, there is an issue with measuring its real impact on data utility. In
this line, we discussed in Sec. 2.3 the problem that merely syntactic metrics may not
reflect the impact of data perturbation, in terms of utility, if these metrics are not
tightly linked with the mechanism through which data utility is extracted. Therefore,
an exploration to find an empirical metric of data utility would enable a more accurate
evaluation of the impact on utility, and would assist researchers in building utility-
preserving privacy protection mechanisms.
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As any perturbative mechanism, anonymization comes at the cost of some infor-
mation loss that may hinder the ulterior purpose of the released data, which very
often is building machine-learning models for macrotrends analysis.
In this chapter we propose to assess the impact of microaggregation on the utility
of anonymized data by calculating the resulting accuracy of said models. In particular,
we address the problem of measuring the effect of k-anonymous microaggregation on
the empirical utility of microdata. For this, we quantify utility as the accuracy of
classification models learned from microaggregated data, and evaluated over original
test data. In a nutshell, our approach seeks to validate whether this impact is major
and, accordingly, whether the metric of distortion (based on MSE) is concordant with
a more empirical vision of data utility.
We apply a rigorous methodology for evaluating the specific impact of microaggre-
gated data on machine-learning tasks. Our methodology uses accuracy and F-measure
as utility metrics. The two are standard measures of performance in machine learn-
ing and allow for the statistical dependence among quasi-identifiers. The impact of
microaggregation on the utility of anonymized data is quantified, accordingly, as the
resulting accuracy (or F-measure) of a machine-learning model trained on a portion
of microaggregated data and evaluated on a different portion of original data.
Since the utility extracted from data could depend on the learning algorithm used,
the results of utility we present correspond to the algorithms that obtain the greatest
accuracy from each anonymized data set. Among others, our experiments investigate
näıve Bayes, logistic regression, SVM, bagging and C4.5. As for microaggregation
algorithms, we focus on MDAV, the SDC de facto standard for k-anonymous micro-
aggregation. The evaluation of MDAV and all those machine-learning algorithms is
conducted in four data sets, three real and one synthetic.
Note that this analysis focuses on high-utility SDC, which involves plain k-anony-
mous microaggregation using numerical microdata. Although more strict privacy
criteria exist, e.g., in the domain of syntactic microaggregation (such as t-closeness or
l-diversity), or in the domain of semantic privacy (such as differential privacy), only













The focus of our analysis
Figure 3.1: Our work focuses on high-utility SDC, involving k-anonymous microaggregation, which
has a direct application, e.g., in the health domain.
privacy mechanisms offering greater utility guarantees for anonymized data are ex-
amined, which may be highly desirable in domains like health. This analysis context
is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [16].
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes our experimental
methodology. Section 3.3 shows the experimental results obtained for a variety of data
sets and machine-learning algorithms. Lastly, conclusions are drawn in Section 3.4.
3.2 Methodology of evaluation
When assessing a privacy protection mechanism, defining the assumptions considered
is fundamental to provide a systematic and repeatable analysis. In addition, the
details of personal data release, as well as the applications used to exploit it, may
vary from case to case, even more in the changing technological world we live in now.
Then, it is convenient to clarify the particular scenario for which our approach is
valid.
Next we describe the elements of this evaluation scenario. While in Section 2.1.1
we briefly introduced attacker and data release models, here we also include the
usability model in Section 3.2.1 where we illustrate by example the practical context
where our evaluation has sense. Moreover, the privacy and utility metrics we use in
this chapter and along the rest of this work are defined in Section 3.2.2.
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Finally, the tools, data sets used, and the methodology followed are described in
Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Attack and usability model
In this chapter, and in the next ones, we assume the standard attack model of the
SDC literature [68]. When a microdata set is released, it is assumed to be available
to any privacy attacker. For research and statistical purposes, released microdata
contains key attributes (basically, demographic data) that are correlated with another,
probably confidential, attribute. In the k-anonymity model, besides, the attacker
knows that a target individual’s record –although microaggregated– is in the released
data set.
To protect that individual’s privacy, an anonymized version of the microdata set
is released. To keep the information usable, i.e., “truthful” [11], microaggregation
is applied to key attributes, while the confidential attribute keeps unperturbed. Re-
searchers may leverage the key attributes by building classifiers on the microaggre-
gated data, for example to predict a given condition. Recall that classification is a
machine learning task that aims to predict the class, or label, of a tuple of informa-
tion. To do so, it requires learning a model from a group of labeled input samples.
In our case, we can assume a large anonymized data set of patients that is publicly
released so that researchers can build classifiers.
As another example of this model, suppose that the taxation authority publishes
a microaggregated data set with 3 key attributes: gender, age, and marital status;
additionally, a confidential binary attribute is published without being modified, spec-
ifying whether a respondent has paid taxes or not. Both perturbed key attributes
and the confidential attribute could be used by researchers to develop algorithms that
predict the propensity of other people to pay taxes. At the same time, the privacy
of a specific individual would be preserved as a result of microaggregation. How-
ever, as commented in previous sections, the macrotrends embedded in the original
data, which are necessary to get more accurate classifiers, might be affected by the
perturbation of the key attributes values caused by microaggregation.
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3.2.2 Measuring privacy and utility
To evaluate the impact of anonymization on the utility of a released microdata set,
quantifiable metrics of privacy and utility are required. Since our experiments focus
on microaggregation as anonymization mechanism, we assume k-anonymity as privacy
criterion. In this manner, the identity of a respondent will be protected in a group
of k tuples sharing the same key attribute values. Higher values of k will imply more
anonymity and then more privacy, although, eventually, less utility.
To measure the utility of anonymized data, we must decide the application domain
of such data. We choose binary classification since it is a very popular workload for
released microdata sets. Accordingly, we measure utility through the performance of
a binary classifier, when executed on anonymized data. Several metrics exist that
measure the performance of binary classification tests. Next, we elaborate on them
with a medical example.
Let D be a binary random variable (r. v.) representing whether a patient has a
given condition (D = 1) or not (D = 0). Let T be a binary r. v. representing the
outcome of a medical test, being T = 1 a positive detection, and T = 0 a negative
detection. By the law of total probability,
P{T = D} = P{T = D | D = 0} P{D = 0} + P{T = D | D = 1} P{D = 1},
and thus,
P{T = D} = P{T = 0 | D = 0} P{D = 0} + P{T = 1 | D = 1} P{D = 1}.
Specificity (true negative rate) and sensitivity (true positive rate) are two metrics
of the performance of a binary classifier and can be defined as P{T = 0 | D = 0}
and P{T = 1 |D = 1}, respectively. In our evaluation, we follow the same approach
as [53, 55, 58] and measure utility as the accuracy of a binary classifier. In our example,
accuracy can be defined as the probability that the test and disease coincide, that is
A = P{T = D}. Accuracy can also be expressed in terms of specificity and sensitivity
as the convex combination
A = (1 − prevalence) × specificity + prevalence × sensitivity
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weighted by the prevalence, that is, the a priori probability of having a disease.
Although accuracy is a very popular metric, when the class of the data is signifi-
cantly unbalanced this metric might incorrectly measure the goodness of a classifier.
Fortunately, other stricter indicators are available such as F-measure, ROC curve and
area under the ROC curve (AuC).
Accuracy quantifies how well a binary classifier performs, in terms of the rate
of correctly classified (as positive or negative) samples in a test set. For example,
a binary classifier constructed to predict diabetes would be 100% accurate if, when
applied on a test set of 600 samples, it correctly identifies the class of the 500 samples
labeled with “no diabetes” and the class of the 100 samples labeled as “diabetes”.
F-Measure (or F1 score) is a machine learning metric that combines other metrics,
particularly recall and precision. In fact, F-Measure is defined as the harmonic mean
of precision and recall. Furthermore, another composed metric is the ROC curve,
which measures the performance of a classifier based on the graphical representation
of the sensitivity in function of the specificity.
For our application domain (binary classification), we first measure the utility of
a microdata set before being microaggregated. Since no perturbation is applied to
the data, the classifier built from that data set would yield the highest accuracy. The
data would therefore give the best achievable utility, but the worst privacy.
In our experiments, we generate several microaggregated versions of a data set, by
varying the value of the privacy parameter k incrementally for a wide range. For each
of these versions, we compute the corresponding classification performance to observe
the progressive degradation of data utility due to microaggregation. We use accuracy
and F-measure to assess the performance of classifiers built with microaggregated
data. Naturally, as k increases, we expect a lower data utility, but obviously in
exchange for higher privacy. Note that, for binary classifiers computed over a set
of data samples and their corresponding labels, the lowest possible accuracy is not
zero. To see this, suppose that “positive” is the majority class (more than 50% of the
training samples are labeled as “positive”). Accordingly, the simplest classifier would
classify any new input as “positive”. Then, interestingly, a binary classifier should
not have accuracy values lower than 50%.
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3.2.3 Experimental setup
Next, we describe the algorithms, tools and data we use to quantify the impact of
k-anonymous microaggregation on the performance of machine-learned classifiers.
3.2.3.1 Algorithms
With regard to microaggregation, our experiments employed MDAV [69], the de facto
standard protocol described in Section 2.2.4.
With the aim of constructing classifiers from microdata, we used the Weka toolkit [70],
a collection of algorithms extensively employed by the machine learning community.
In the interest of fairness when measuring the impact of microaggregation, we as-
signed each data set the machine learning algorithm that extracts the greatest utility
from it. Accordingly, we measured said impact with respect to the highest achievable
utility. In order to find the corresponding algorithm for a data set, we tried on it a
range of machine learning algorithms, including näıve Bayes, logistic regression, SVM,
bagging, and C4.5. The reasons for choosing this set is manifold. First, we included
different algorithms to observe whether the effects of microaggregation are consistent
along different utility extraction techniques. Moreover, we selected näıve Bayes and
SVM since in several previous works [53, 55, 56, 58] they have been adapted to obtain
more utility from anonymized data. Additionally, logistic regression, C4.5 and bag-
ging were considered to represent the main families of machine learning classifiers,
i.e., regression, decision tree, and ensemble algorithms, respectively. For each data
set, we chose the algorithm showing the best performance in the classification task,
i.e., the highest accuracy. This way, we tested the impact of microaggregation in the
different utility contexts or domains defined by a variety of data sets and machine
learning algorithms.
3.2.3.2 Data
For the purpose of illustration, we evaluated the impact of microaggregation first on
a synthetic data set. The effect of microaggregation on real scenarios was assessed
afterwards in data sets satisfying these four properties. First, we require data sets
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containing demographic attributes so that they reflect the typical characteristics of
microdata. Secondly, we considered only data sets whose potential key attributes are
correlated with a given sensitive (label) attribute, so the latter could be effectively
predicted (classified). Thirdly, we needed a relatively large number of records (e.g.,
more than 500) to have a better view of the overall effect of microaggregation, using
an incremental value of the privacy parameter k. Finally, we used standardized or
already tested data sets so that our results could be easily reproduced. It is worth
noting that predictive demographic data turned out to be a very restrictive condition
when we searched for data sets to carry out the tests.
For the sake of simplicity and ease in its graphic representation, we built the
synthetic data set with only two numerical attributes (x1, x2) resembling quasi-iden-
tifiers, and a binary attribute (y) as the confidential attribute. The data set was
generated so that y is to some extent predictable from x1 and x2 and had 30,000
records. In Sec. 3.3.2, we describe in greater detail the process by which the syn-
thetic data set was generated and show a preliminary experiment to illustrate the
effects of microaggregation.
Regarding the experiments on real data sets, we first employed the standardized
“Adult” data set from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [71], described in Table
3.1. The data set in question has been widely used to evaluate binary classifiers and
privacy preserving mechanisms. Its 45,222 records are already split into two parts, for
training (2/3) and testing (1/3) purposes. The data set contains 15 input demographic
attributes and a binary label attribute, the salary, which is the attribute the machine
learning algorithm tries to predict. In particular, the attribute specifies whether a
person makes over 50K a year or not. The attributes we use as quasi-identifiers are
age, education-num, marital-status, sex, capital-gain, and hours-per-week.
The second standardized data set was “Pima Indians Diabetes” [72] which contains
768 records and 9 demographic attributes. Available at the UCI Machine Learning
Repository, this data set has been used in [51, 54, 55]. The 8 attributes we selected
allows predicting whether an individual will be diagnosed with diabetes or not. The
third real data set we considered in our experiments was the “Irish Census” [73], a
synthetic version of the data from the 2011 Irish Census, which has been used in [74]
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and [75] to evaluate and compare k-anonymization algorithms. It contains 100,000
records and 10 demographic attributes. Originally, it was not built with a predictive
task in mind, but 5 of its attributes could be used to predict an individual’s economic
status (employed or unemployed).
Table 3.1 describes the main characteristics of the data sets tested in our experi-
ments, and Table 3.2 shows the machine learning algorithms employed for each data
set.
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Table 3.2: Machine learning algorithms used in our experimental evaluation






It builds decision trees from training data, where attribute
nodes are selected based on their information gain (mutual
information).
Adult [71] Ensemble Bagging
Bootstrap aggregation is an ensemble of decision trees that
improves classification tasks by combining the classification
results of randomly (bootstrap) generated training data sets






It is a regression model that probabilistically estimates a binary
response (binary classification) based on a set of predictors. It is





It builds decision trees from training data, where attribute
nodes are selected based on their information gain (mutual
information).
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3.2.3.3 Additional Tasks
Since our implementation of MDAV only operates with numerical attributes, we con-
ducted some preprocessing tasks on the data sets described in the previous subsection.
Specifically, we converted some useful categorical attributes to numeric, where pos-
sible, and binarized the sensitive attribute, where necessary, so that the application
domain of data was binary classification.
3.2.4 Experimental methodology
The steps we follow to evaluate the impact of microaggregation on the utility of mi-
crodata are in line with the attack and utility models described at the beginning of
Section 3.2.1 and are illustrated in Fig. 3.2. As a first data preprocessing step, we
extract the quasi-identifiers of our interest from each data set, according to the guide-
lines described in the previous subsection. Moreover, from the selected attributes, we
“numerize” the categorical data so that they are compatible with MDAV. Finally, we
identify the quasi-identifiers that are then used as input samples and the sensitive
label attribute that will serve as the class to be predicted by the classification model.
The next step splits each microdata set into training and test sets. As is common in
the evaluation of machine learning algorithms, a model is constructed from a training
subset of the data and is evaluated on the test subset. Following such methodology,
we use two-thirds of the data for training and one-third for testing. The splitting is
done in such a way that the class attribute is stratified in each subset, according to
its original distribution in the data set.
After splitting the data into training and test sets, the microaggregation process
is performed using MDAV over the latter set. To this end, previously we followed the
common practice of normalizing each column of the data to have zero mean and unit
variance.
With the microaggregated versions of each (training) data set, we then construct a
classification model over each of those versions using Weka and 5-fold cross validation.
The learning algorithms we use for each data set are listed in Table 3.2. Finally, we
evaluate the accuracy of the resulting classification models over the non-anonymized















Figure 3.2: Experimental methodology followed to evaluate the impact of MDAV-based k-anonymous
microaggregation on the empirical utility of microdata.
test subset, reproducing the application scenario where a database user would use the
classification model to classify their original samples of data.
3.3 Experimental results
3.3.1 Preliminary experiment
To get some intuition about the impact of microaggregation and its clustering ca-
pability on the empirical utility of anonymized data, we next make an analogy with
the operation of some machine learning algorithms. Consider the k-nearest neighbors
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algorithm (kNN), a simple classifier, and assume a data set with n training tuples,
each one assigned to a binary class label. kNN classifies a new tuple according to a
majority vote of its k closest “neighboring training tuples” in the feature space. Note
that, in this context, k has nothing to do with anonymity. A small k implies consider-
ing few neighboring samples for classification, which would be the most representative
ones, being the closest, but would not be so reliable in terms of predictability. On
the other hand, a large k implies taking more (and not so close) neighboring samples,
being demographically less representative, but predictably more reliable. This trade-
off is illustrated in Fig. 3.3, where we measure the accuracy of kNN on the original
UCI Adult data set for several values of k. As depicted in Fig. 3.3, the classification
accuracy of kNN improves as groups rather than individual samples are considered
to robustly infer what would effectively constitute a macrotrend.
 












Figure 3.3: Accuracy of the kNN machine learning algorithm applied on the UCI Adult data set,
for different values of k (here, k is not related with k-anonymity).
We argue that microaggregation would be acting analogously to kNN when aggre-
gating neighboring data points to construct cells, and computing averages to get rep-
resentative centroids for each cluster. Such clustering could be regarded as a denoising
process. In fact, the benefit of preprocessing data with unsupervised techniques based
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on clustering, prior to supervised learning, is known in the machine-learning litera-
ture. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect k-anonymous microaggregation to
have a minor (and sometimes even positive) impact on the empirical utility of data,
measured as the accuracy of machine learning models when deriving macrotrends.
3.3.2 Measuring the impact of microaggregation on a syn-
thetic data set
We begin our experiments by analyzing the effect of microaggregation on synthetic
data. To this end, we generate 30,000 samples of 3-dimensional Gaussian data. The
first two dimensions are assumed to be quasi-identifiers, and the third dimension
represents a binary confidential attribute. Since we require that the quasi-identifiers
be predictors of the confidential attribute (as would be, e.g., the weight and height
predictors of the existence or not of a disease in an individual), we introduce in
the data a learnable macrotrend or dependence among the quasi-identifiers and the
confidential attribute.
Next, we describe how we generate this synthetic data set. Let X be a bidimen-
sional continuous r.v. representing the two quasi-identifiers (x1, x2), and let Y be a
binary r.v. indicating whether an individual has a disease (Y = 1) or not (Y = 0).
The data set is generated in two parts, each matched to a different value of Y . Ac-
cordingly, X is distributed as a unit-variance Gaussian distribution with mean µ for
Y = 1, and with mean −µ, for Y = 0. In Fig. 3.4, we represent this data set by
plotting the values of X for each record as coordinates of a point in a plane, coloring
each point according to the class to which it belongs. As expected, two clouds of
points are obtained (the red one, for Y = 1, slightly on the right; and the blue one,
for Y = 0, on the left) where we can guess the optimal threshold to estimate the class
Ŷ of each point.
Let P{Y = 1|x} be the discriminative model of this problem. The prevalence p of
a disease in this data set is the proportion of records matched to the class Y = 1. It
is routine to represent this model, using logarithmic odds, as
L{Y = 1 | X = x} = 2µx+ ln p
1− p
.
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Figure 3.4: Depiction of the quasi-identifiers (x2 vs x1) of our synthetic data set. Samples are
colored according to their class, y; blue for y = 0 and red for y = 1.
 











Figure 3.5: Depiction of the quasi-identifiers (x2 vs x1) of our synthetic data set. Samples are
colored according to their class, y; blue for y = 0 and red for y = 1.
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We denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the zero-mean, unit-variance
Gaussian distribution as Φ. The accuracy A of our model to find the estimated class
Ŷ can be expressed as
A = P{Y = Ŷ } = (1− p)Φ(θ + µ) + pΦ(µ− θ),
for a given threshold x = θ . It is straightforward to derive the optimal threshold
θ∗ for maximum accuracy of our discriminative model, which is






In order to have a balanced data set, we use p = 0.5, thus half of the samples are
matched to each class. Consequently, the optimal threshold to classify both parts of
the data set is θ∗ = 0. Additionally, we choose µ = 0.125 so that the distribution of
both groups of samples are close; evidently, the more overlapped the two groups are,
the more difficult the classification task.
Next, we train a machine learning model over a stratified part of the synthetic
data, using the C4.5 algorithm. Since µ is low, the accuracy obtained from the
classifier is 60%. Based on this model, we predict the class using the quasi-identifiers.
Then, in Fig. 3.5, we plot the same clouds of samples of Fig. 3.4, but now we color
them according to the predicted class. Accordingly, the classification threshold is
evident.
To analyze the impact of microaggregation, we apply MDAV to the training set of
this data set with k = 3000, which is a very large value of cluster size. Accordingly,
we get 7 cells that we plot in Fig. 3.6 with distinct colors; the classification threshold
is also plotted. Notice in the figure that, after the clustering applied by MDAV, the
samples of 3 out of 7 cells might be misclassified with a higher probability since such
samples are distributed on both sides of the classification threshold. However, the
remaining 4 cells, which account for about 57% of the data, are clearly defined on one
side of the classification threshold, so they would be correctly classified. Hence, even
after microaggregation, machine-learned macrotrends might not suffer a significant
impact, i.e., the accuracy obtained from original data is not harshly reduced, even for
high values of k.
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Figure 3.6: Cells of samples obtained after k-anonymous microaggregation with MDAV on the
quasi-identifiers of our synthetic data set (k = 3000).
To illustrate more systematically this effect on data utility, we plot in Fig. 3.7 the
accuracy and F-measure of the learning model obtained from our synthetic data, after
anonymizing it with different values of k. Consistently with the previous experiment,
none of these utility metrics is drastically affected by the influence of microaggre-
gation, for practical values of k. Another metric of the impact of microaggregation
(not necessarily in terms of utility degradation) is also depicted in Fig. 3.8. Here,
we observe that distortion, measured in terms of MSE, increases with k. However,
distortion starts soon to increase significantly from k = 100. This divergence between
accuracy and distortion is evidenced in Fig. 3.9, where the connection between both
seems nonspecific and nonlinear. A more detailed discussion regarding these results
is presented in the next section, where real data is considered.
3.3.3 Results from real data sets
We begin our first series of experiments by computing the relevance of the number
of predictive attributes in each data set. The aim is to analyze how the accuracy of
the classification task varies with the number of predictive attributes. To determine
the order of the attributes employed, we used sequential forward selection, which
consists in sequentially adding attributes to an empty set until the addition of fur-
ther attributes does not decrease the accuracy of the classification task. Figure 3.10
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Figure 3.7: Degradation of the empirical utility (accuracy and F-measure) of our synthetic data set
when microaggregated (using MDAV) for a wide range of k.
 







Figure 3.8: Distortion, measured as MSE, introduced by MDAV k-anonymous microaggregation to
our synthetic data set, considering a wide range of k.
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Figure 3.9: Accuracy of the bagging machine learning model trained on our microaggregated syn-
thetic data set, against the distortion due to MDAV.
illustrates the variation of accuracy with the number of predictive attributes for UCI
Adult.
Although intuition could suggest that even small levels of data perturbation might
yield important reductions in utility, riveting results were found in our experiments
when using microaggregation. First, Fig. 3.11 shows how the accuracy and F-measure
of the classifier degrades as the privacy parameter k increases, when anonymizing the
UCI Adult data set. As expected, accuracy attains its highest value (about 85%)
when no anonymization is applied (k = 1). For k = 200, which is a relatively large
value of cluster size, accuracy only decreases up to 82%. We also note that, even
for a value of k of 3, 000, which implies a strong level of anonymity, accuracy is
approximately 80%.
Figure 3.11 also depicts a dotted line to represent the lowest accuracy achieved
by the machine learning algorithm (76.37%) when no predictor attributes are used
(suppression of all quasi-identifiers); this provides the highest level of privacy pro-
tection. Note that, when all quasi-identifiers are suppressed, the machine learning
model always classifies a new instance depending on the majority value of the class
attribute.
From the figure, we observe that a reduction in accuracy from 85% to 82% (at-
tained for k = 200) when the key attribute (important predictor) “Capital Gain”
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Figure 3.10: Relevance of the cumulative number of selected attributes from the UCI Adult data
set as predictors of the class attribute (Annual Salary).
 













Figure 3.11: Degradation of the empirical utility (accuracy and F-measure) of the UCI Adult data
set when microaggregated (using MDAV) for a wide range of k.
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is eliminated. Similarly, even when k = 3, 000, we obtain a smaller impact on util-
ity (accuracy of 80%) than when all predictors –except “Education Number”– are
suppressed. This are good news for microaggregation, since it suggests that we can
still get useful microdata after applying more than reasonable levels of privacy. The
reported values of accuracy and other metrics (F-measure and AuC) are shown, in
more detail, in Table 3.3.
 









Figure 3.12: Distortion introduced by MDAV k-anonymous microaggregation to the UCI Adult data
set, when microaggregated for a wide range of k.
The impact of MDAV on the UCI Adult data set was also measured in terms of the
distortion introduced to quasi-identifiers. We used MSE to quantify such distortion.
In Fig. 3.12, we can see how distortion increases from 0 (when k = 1) to 0.62 (for
k = 3, 000). Specifically, we observed a pronounced growth from k = 100, although
for values of k smaller than 100, distortion did not seem significant.
In Fig. 3.13, we plot accuracy vs distortion. The most relevant conclusion that
can be drawn from this figure is that accuracy stays relatively stable (greater than
80%) up to distortions of 0.7. Precisely, although MSE is conventionally used in SDC
to compare the utility of microaggregation algorithms, we observe that this distortion
metric says little about the impact on the performance of a machine-learning classifier.
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Table 3.3: Different utility metrics for the UCI Adult data set when microaggregated for a wide
range of k.
k Accuracy F-Measure AuC
1 84.63 0.841 0.902
2 84.48 0.839 0.898
3 84.33 0.837 0.897
5 84.35 0.837 0.897
10 84.44 0.838 0.898
20 84.15 0.838 0.891
30 84.11 0.833 0.887
50 83.91 0.831 0.883
100 82.88 0.821 0.875
200 81.95 0.810 0.861
300 83.00 0.819 0.848
500 82.07 0.815 0.827
1000 80.38 0.773 0.794
2000 80.61 0.797 0.693
3000 80.22 0.745 0.585
In other words, the data yielded by this figure seems to provide convincing evidence
that MSE is not a suitable measure of utility for classification tasks.
In our evaluation of the UCI Pima Indian Diabetes data set in Fig. 3.14, we
noted that the degradation margin of utility goes from 74.2% (when k = 1, thus
without perturbation) to 65.23% (from k = 100). Microaggregation showed a similar
behavior to that observed in the UCI Adult data set but, being 50 times smaller,
it evidently degrades more quickly as k increases. However, a noticeable stability is
appreciated in accuracy up to k =30 and, in fact, this performance metric remains
close to the upper baseline at around 74%. For values of k between 10 and 30,
accuracy was even improved, which could be explained by the denoising effect of
averaging through clever clustering, that may positively contribute to a more robust
inference. This effect was described in Sec. 3.3.2. Interestingly, Fig. 3.15 showed a
sustained increase in distortion as k becomes larger. To gain insight into this relative
stability in accuracy, we also plotted accuracy vs distortion in Fig. 3.16 and confirmed
that, up to distortions of 50%, utility remains close to the upper baseline. The values
of accuracy and other metrics (F-measure and AuC) obtained for this data set are
also shown in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.13: Accuracy of the bagging machine learning model trained on the microaggregated UCI
Adult data set, against the distortion due to MDAV.
 













Figure 3.14: Degradation of the empirical utility of the UCI Pima Indians Diabetes data set when
microaggregated (using MDAV) for a wide range of k.
46 CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF MDAV ON THE EMPIRICAL UTILITY OF DATA
 









Figure 3.15: Distortion introduced by MDAV k-anonymous microaggregation to the UCI Pima
Indians data set, for a wide range of k.
 
























Figure 3.16: Accuracy of the logistic regression model trained on the microaggregated UCI Pima
Indians Diabetes data set, against the distortion due to MDAV.
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Table 3.4: Different utility metrics for the UCI Pima Indians data set when microaggregated for a
wide range of k
k Accuracy F-Measure AuC
1 74.21 0.735 0.813
2 73.43 0.729 0.810
3 73.43 0.728 0.808
5 73.04 0.726 0.804
10 73.43 0.730 0.806
20 76.17 0.754 0.807
30 76.56 0.757 0.789
50 69.53 0.683 0.758
100 65.23 0.644 0.716
Finally, we examine the Irish data set in Fig. 3.17. Here, we observe a wide
degradation margin since its label attribute has balanced classes. Specifically, accu-
racy goes from 72.62% to about 68.04% when the privacy parameter k equals 3,000.
Also, we can see, once again, that accuracy remains quite high (more than 70%) and
stable up to k = 2, 000. A similar behavior is observed for F-measure. Although the
size of the data set at hand is relatively large (100K instances), the available evidence
suggests that the reduction of empirical utility of the data due to microaggregation
is not significant for a wide range of values of k. Such effect is also noticeable in Fig.
3.18, where we plot accuracy vs distortion. Table 3.5 shows the reported values of
accuracy, as well as other metrics (F-measure and AuC), in greater detail.
 













Figure 3.17: Degradation of the empirical utility (accuracy) of the Irish Census data set when
microaggregated for a wide range of k.
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Figure 3.18: Accuracy of the C4.5 machine learning model trained over the microaggregated Irish
Census data set, against the distortion due to MDAV.
Our experimental findings confirm that MDAV introduces sufficiently small levels
of perturbation in the quasi-identifiers, so that the statistical properties of the pub-
lished data can be preserved to a large extent, while satisfying a given k-anonymity
constraint. The upshot is that much of the empirical utility is retained within the mi-
croaggregated data. In fact, the results of our experiments suggest that such impact
is often minor, since microaggregation preserves machine-learned macrotrends. We
believe that the average operations performed by MDAV to find a centroid represen-
tative of k tuples are working as a noising removal filter that prevents the classifier
algorithm from adjusting to the existing noise in the data.
Interestingly, although not explicitly reported in these terms, previous work sur-
veyed in Section 2.3.2 appears to be consistent with our findings. For example, in [55],
where different algorithms based on generalization and suppression are compared, the
degradation in accuracy is certainly small in many cases. Other works in the literature
give some clues about a potential “constructive effect” of anonymization mechanisms.
In that sense, [53] mentions that anonymization might sometimes behave as a form
of feature selection or construction. Moreover, in [58], the authors conclude that a
selective anonymization may not be so destructive. Finally, although using a less
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Table 3.5: Different utility metrics for the Irish Census data set when microaggregated for a wide
range of k
k Accuracy F-Measure AuC
1 72.62 0.721 0.736
2 72.62 0.721 0.733
3 72.62 0.721 0.733
5 72.61 0.721 0.733
10 72.52 0.720 0.733
20 72.60 0.721 0.733
30 72.60 0.721 0.733
50 72.62 0.721 0.734
100 72.40 0.720 0.731
200 72.40 0.719 0.735
300 72.33 0.720 0.729
500 72.17 0.719 0.718
1000 71.58 0.710 0.729
2000 70.48 0.693 0.739
3000 68.04 0.675 0.703
conclusive argument, [56] states that, while making no changes to existing tools and
systems, significant utility can be extracted from anonymized data.
Testing a wide range of values of the privacy parameter helps to make visible the
overall effect of anonymization on data utility. Doing so also assists in noticing the
influence of other critical criteria such as the size of the data set and the absolute
upper and lower bounds of utility. As shown in our experimental results, the utility
of anonymized microdata, measured as classification accuracy, may not take values
strictly from 0 to 100%. The intrinsic statistical properties of released data would
already limit the capabilities of machine learning algorithms and, thus, the improve-
ments they get over baseline methods (e.g., always predicting the most frequent class
in the training set). Evidently, very little utility can be maintained after anonymiza-
tion if machine learning (classification) algorithms perform poorly, by default, with
respect to the baseline. Unfortunately, these considerations are not always made
when evaluating the performance of k-anonymous microaggregation or, in general, of
anonymization mechanisms.
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3.4 Conclusion
The experiments presented in this chapter have indicated, with some consistency, that
the impact of the de facto microaggregation standard (Maximum Distance to Average
Vector, MDAV) on the performance of machine learning algorithms is often minor to
negligible for a wide range of k, for a variety of classification algorithms and data sets.
Furthermore, experimental evidences have suggested that the traditional measure of
distortion in the community of microdata anonymization may be inappropriate for
evaluating the utility of microaggregated data.
With the advent of the Internet and the development of sophisticated data ana-
lytics, the availability of massive amounts of information has increased the demand
for data sharing. In the context of structured data, microdata are an invaluable
source of information for their potential to reveal patterns or macrotrends about the
population there represented.
Before these data can be made public or shared with external entities, data holders
must ensure individual privacy is safeguarded. Perturbing quasi-identifiers attributes
is the usual approach to prevent identity disclosure in microdata. Nonetheless, while
perturbation may prevent reidentification attacks, it may have a large impact on
data utility, particularly on the performance of machine-learning tasks. To cope with
it, several works have proposed adapting data-anonymization or machine-learning
algorithms to get more utility from anonymized data. We claim in this work, however,
that the default operation of some anonymization mechanisms may not affect data
utility significantly.
We have investigated in this chapter the high-utility SDC spectrum, implemented
by syntactic k-anonymous microaggregation, which has a direct application on the
health domain where utility is critical. Our experiments have shown, with some
consistency, that k-anonymous microaggregation implemented through MDAV does
not have a significant impact on machine-learned macrotrends for multiple data sets
and a wide range of machine-learning algorithms. Trying to consider the domain of
data in our evaluation, we not only tested different data sets but also multiple learning
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algorithms to extract the maximum utility from the data. Then, these algorithms were
selected to get the highest accuracy from each data set.
These excellent results on learning performance from microaggregated data de-
serve careful attention. As the lack of substantial degradation in classification accu-
racy for a generous range of microcell sizes k may be somewhat counterintuitive, we
conducted further verification on such remarkable finding. Specifically, we applied
the k-nearest neighbor algorithm (kNN) to the original, unperturbed data, in order
to verify our working hypothesis that clustering effectively acts as a form of averag-
ing and thus denoising. In our verification, k is the usual name for the parameter
governing the size of the cluster of the kNN algorithm, analogous to some extent to
the anonymity parameter.
We contend that a similar denoising effect, akin to averaging through clustering,
is the underlying cause of the striking utility of k-anonymous microaggregation. Con-
ceivably, for reasonable values of the anonymity parameter k, microaggregation should
not substantially devalue the process of inference of macrotrends carried out by the
machine learning algorithm. Moreover, high-utility microaggregation algorithms such
as MDAV may, in some cases, positively contribute to a more robust inference by de-
noising through clever clustering of demographically similar individuals. The benefit
of preprocessing data with unsupervised techniques based on clustering, prior to su-
pervised learning, is known in the machine-learning literature. The lack of substantial
degradation in classification performance due to k-anonymous microaggregation, and
the occasional slight improvement in utility, is a novel result of strategic importance
in the privacy arena.
Finally, these results provide confirmatory evidence that, while keeping a mono-
tonicity relationship with accuracy, the traditional utility metric of SDC (i.e., MSE)
is not an ideal metric to determine the impact on the utility of microaggregated data,
since there exists a non-specific non-linear dependence.
Chapter 4
Comparison of the impact of
different microaggregation
algorithms on the empirical utility
of data
4.1 Introduction
As we discussed in Sec. 2.1, currently, in the big data era, there are several incentives
to exploit data. In general, there is more data available, and better and cheaper
technology to take advantage of it, including, e.g., a lot of algorithms for machine
learning analytics. The potential benefits of these technologies are countless in several
fields such as healthcare, advertising, and even industrial engineering ([76–78]). Said
benefits entail important economic profits, so giant tech companies are leveraging data
as core assets ([79]) that are disclosed (exploited, shared or even sold) to maximize
profit.
Unfortunately, since personal information is inevitably involved in this data, such
incentives and tools to exploit data may easily imply abusing user privacy. Even
if direct identifier attributes such as full names are suppressed, the combination of
several non-direct identifier attributes (also known as quasi-identifiers) may still be
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used to re-identify an individual. If a sensitive attribute (e.g., gender, health status,
income) were disclosed, re-identification would enable an attacker to associate an
individual with such attribute, violating her privacy.
To mitigate such risk, the data needs to undergo first a process of anonymization,
which typically implies modifying the data. In this regard, statistical disclosure control
offers an interesting approach to protect individual privacy while preserving some of
the data utility.
Since the criteria posed by privacy models are invariably met by perturbing quasi-
identifiers to anonymize data, there is an impact on the data in terms of loss in
utility ([24]). However, said utility loss may vary according to the strategy followed
by the privacy mechanism, even when the privacy parameter is already met. If the
resulting data utility does not meet the requirements of the application domain (e.g.,
health) a different privacy parameter or mechanism should be used. Some of these
mechanisms include microaggregation, suppression, generalization and noise addition.
Being a high-utility approach that may be applicable for critical domains such as
health, our work is devoted to k-anonymous microaggregation. In Sec. 2.2 we have
described some of its foundations, and, in chapter 3, the de facto standard microag-
gregation algorithm (MDAV) was evaluated in terms of data utility degradation.
Although MDAV demonstrated to be a utility-preserving anonymization algorithm
to some extent, there are other algorithms following a similar microaggregation spirit.
Once agreeing, as discussed in Sec. 2.3 , on the relevance of metrics capturing the
practical utility of anonymized data, it would be interesting to assess the impact of
these privacy mechanisms on such utility. This would help unveil the strategies that
best preserve utility, but also whether or not standard metrics faithfully predict such
practical utility.
k-Anonymous microaggregation is typically implemented through different mech-
anisms. In this chapter, we evaluate the most relevant of such mechanisms [2, 26, 42]
in terms of the practical utility of the anonymized data.
Our evaluation aims to provide insight into those implementations by assessing
them in terms of the loss in classification accuracy of the machine-learned models
built from modified data. We employ non standard, but empirical utility metrics
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taken from machine learning, which is currently a very common application data
domain.
In our evaluation of such mechanisms, we aimed to identify the anonymization
parameters of each of them that may help preserve the macrotrends of the data. Our
extensive experiments found out that the efforts to preserve the statistical dependence
within quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes (such as in MDAV with statistical
dependence) may effectively attenuate the impact of microaggregation on the utility
of data.
Last but not least, for all the examined microaggregation algorithms, we also
investigated the capability of a standard distortion metric to predict the empirical
utility of anonymized data.
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the k-anonymous
microaggregation algorithms evaluated here. Next, Sec. 4.3 describes the method-
ology followed to evaluate such impact. Section 4.4 shows the experimental results
obtained for a variety of microaggregation algorithms, data sets and machine-learn-
ing algorithms. Lastly, a brief discussion is presented in Sec. 4.5 and conclusions are
drawn in Sec. 4.6.
4.2 Background on k-anonymous microaggregation
algorithms
In this section we briefly describe some well-known microaggregation algorithms with
the aim of introducing the strategies followed to group and reconstruct microcells.
This will provide with some feedback for the evaluation performed in this chapter
that focuses on unveiling the utility preserving capabilities of k-anonymous microag-
gregation, but particularly on showing that some efforts to preserve the statistical
dependence within data would help to increase said empirical utility.
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In 2.2.4, we already referred to MDAV as the de facto standard for microaggrega-
tion of numerical microdata [29]. By systematically finding the furthest k-anonymous
cells within the data set, MDAV replaces each record with the centroid (average) of
its corresponding cell. It evolved from the multivariate fixed-size microaggregation
method and was proposed by [26]. MDAV provides an excellent heuristic method
for multivariate microaggregation [42] in terms of utility, measured both syntacti-
cally [42] and empirically [16], and in terms of computation complexity. Note that
MDAV generates cells of fixed size k and potentially a cell with size 2k − 1.
V-MDAV ([42]), follows a similar strategy to MDAV but enables the aggregation
process to generate variable-size cells. When k records are already aggregated, an
extension step may include more records to the cell being formed (up to a total
2k − 1) if they are “close enough” to this cell. The inclusion decision is defined by
a gain parameter γ that must be adjusted depending on the data set. It offers less
distortion for some data sets at a computational cost comparable to that of MDAV.
Unlike traditional k-anonymous microaggregation (e.g., through MDAV) where
only the values of quasi-identifiers X are considered when building microcells, mi-
croaggregation with preservation of statistical dependence (we call it MDAV
with SD) also includes confidential attributes ([2]) in the partition design. Thus, if a
confidential attribute Y has to be predicted, this approach would lead to a more ac-
curate prediction (e.g., classification) from perturbed quasi-identifiers X̂. To involve
both types of attributes, the authors propose designing a cell assignment function
that minimizes a multiobjective Lagrangian distortion function
D = (1− λ)DX + λDY
where DX is the traditional information loss term based on MSE, DY characterizes the
degradation in statistical dependence, captured through the non linear predictability
of Y from X, and λ controls the tradeoff between these two optimization objectives.
Finally, Mondrian, presented in [80], is a greedy algorithm that recursively par-
titions a microdata set in regions of at least k records, where a dimension (attribute)
and a value about which to partition have to be heuristically chosen in each iteration.
This is a microaggregation algorithm in the sense that it partitions a microdata set
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in variable-size cells, satisfying the k-anonymity criteria. The values of the quasi-
identifiers for each cell are reconstructed as non-overlapping intervals in which such
values are contained. Intuitively, such partitions are defined as hyperrectangles in the
multidimensional space of quasi-identifiers.
4.3 Methodology of Evaluation
4.3.1 Evaluation context
Our evaluation scenario is similar to that presented in Sec. 2.1.1, i.e., involves a mi-
crodata set whose quasi-identifiers are correlated with its corresponding confidential
attribute. Moreover, this information may have to be publicly released for research
purposes, so k-anonymous microaggregation is applied over quasi-identifiers to pro-
tect the privacy of data subjects. This is the standard attack model of the SDC
literature ([68]).
Accordingly, anonymized quasi-identifiers (here also input samples) would be pub-
lished along with untouched confidential attributes (also output labels) to feed a ma-
chine learning classifier, which is the enabler of the selected application domain of
data. The resulting models would allow external data analysts to build predictive
models on different testing data. Intuitively, the quality of the statistical trends em-
bedded in the resulting anonymized data would be undermined with respect to those
in the original data.
Although in chapter 3 we confirmed that MDAV offers interesting benefits in
terms of distortion and classification accuracy, additional variations exist, some even
incorporating utility improvements ([2]), which have not been assessed in this context.
Finally, the privacy metric we use is naturally k-anonymity since microaggregation
algorithms aim at guaranteeing such criteria. In addition, we also assume binary
classification as the application domain of data, so the utility metric is the accuracy
of the classification model built from anonymized data, as performed in [53, 55, 58].
Basically, accuracy quantifies the rate of correctly classified samples in a test set.
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Besides, we also use a complementary machine learning metric, F-measure, to confirm
our results in the next sections.
Thus, higher values of k, implying larger anonymous microcells, will offer more
privacy but, at some point, less utility.
4.3.2 Scenario setup
As can be grasped from the sections above, our experimental setup builds on the
algorithms for privacy protection and utility exploitation, the data sets used to assess
the impact of anonymization, and the steps taken to get the results.
Being MDAV the de facto microaggregation algorithm, we extend the study pre-
sented in chapter 3 by assessing not only MDAV but also V-MDAV ([42] and MDAV
with SD [2]). As explained in Sect. 4.2, both of them aim at increasing the data util-
ity preserved, measured from the distortion applied by these two variants of MDAV.
While V-MDAV proposes building larger microcells, when possible, to favor forming
more compacted clusters, MDAV with SD builds microcells capturing the statistical
dependence between quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes. Moreover, Mon-
drian ([80]) is also considered in our setup to corroborate the performance of micro-
aggregation algorithms, no matter the strategy used to build k-anonymous microcells.
Some of the implementation details of these algorithms and further references are in-
cluded in Sec. 4.3.1.
To measure the utility of microaggregated data, we use the machine learning
algorithms that obtain the best performance, in terms of classification accuracy, from
each of our data sets. Since the intrinsic nature of the data sets might vary, we
experimentally determine the best performer by testing a series of algorithms such as
boosted trees, logistic regression, Support Vector Machine, and k-nearest neighbor on
the original data. This way we more rigorously adapt our evaluation to the specific
utility context.
The data where microaggregation algorithms were assessed includes both real and
synthetic data sets. As in chapter 3, we look for data sets meeting two main re-
quirements: include demographic attributes and evidence a correlation between the
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quasi-identifiers and a confidential attribute. We briefly describe their characteris-
tics in Table 4.1. The first is the “Adult” data set ([71]), which is a standard when
assessing microaggregation algorithms. Although this data set has 15 attributes, for
our tests we use the six that contribute the most to the application domain; the
contribution of the rest for binary classification is null. We also tested the “Breast
Cancer Wisconsin” data set ([81]) and the “Heart disease” data set ([82]) that con-
tain medical data extensively used to evaluate binary classification tasks. Finally, we
created an elementary synthetic data set with three attributes mimicking two quasi-
identifiers and a binary confidential attribute; to do it, two groups of two-dimensional
quasi-identifiers are generated following two different, but overlapping, normal distri-
butions.
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We employed Matlab 2018B to implement the aforementioned microaggregation
algorithms ([2, 27, 42]), except for Mondrian, as well as to deploy the evaluation of
perturbed data sets, and to process and plot results. Said evaluation implies load-
ing data, building machine learning models over it, and applying such models over
new data to measure classification accuracy, F-measure, and distortion. The imple-
mentation of Mondrian was written in Python and was taken from [83]. Since the
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reconstruction method applied by Mondrian returns intervals instead of single val-
ues for each microaggregated attribute, we adapted this reconstruction such that the
multidimensional hyperrectangles (microcells) were replaced by their corresponding
centroids. The exploratory analysis to define the best suitable classification algorithm
for each data set is performed with the Classification Learner application included in
Matlab 2018B and then the model training and evaluation were automatized using
specific embedded functions for each algorithm.
4.3.3 Methodology
The experimental methodology used to assess the performance of microaggrega-
tion algorithms in terms of resulting empirical utility is basically the same followed
in the previous chapter, which is particularly described in Sec. 3.2.4. Figure 4.1
synthesizes the main elements of such procedure.
First, the original data set is preprocessed through three steps. To start, since
MDAV based algorithms only work with numerical data, any categorical values for
quasi-identifiers are represented numerically (e.g., the values female and male for sex
are replaced with 1 and 0). Moreover, for validation purposes explained in the next
paragraphs, we split each data set in two sets: a training set and a test set such that
the former’s size is 3/4 of the data set. Afterwards, each column of the training set,
involving only quasi-identifiers, are normalized such that each column has zero mean
and unit variance. Note that normalization is useful to avoid the harmful impact on
microaggregation resulting from attributes having different ranges.
Once normalized, the microaggregation algorithm is fed with the training set for
data perturbation. Only in the case of MDAV with SD, confidential attributes are
also considered since this algorithm exploits the statistical dependence between quasi-
identifiers and confidential attributes. We use progressively increasing values of k to
then measure the utility degradation of data due to k-anonymous microaggregation.
Besides the generic privacy criteria k, other parameters are configured for some algo-
rithms.
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Figure 4.1: Experimental methodology followed to assess k-anonymous microaggregation algorithms
in terms of the empirical utility preserved.
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V-MDAV requires a gain parameter γ that we set in 0.9 as set by [42]. Additionally,
MDAV with SD can be tuned by a λ parameter that regulates the tradeoff between
distortion of quasi-identifiers and distortion of confidential attributes; we test different
values of λ from 0 to 1 in order to get those showing the highest utility (maximum
utility trace).
Once quasi-identifiers are perturbed, we implement the utility extraction phase.
For this, we build a classification model using the microaggregated version of each
data set as input. The algorithms showing the best performance in terms of util-
ity are boosting trees and logistic regression, and the specific functions implemented
in Matlab 2018b are used for training using 5-fold cross validation. Finally, each
resulting classification model is evaluated over the test set originally extracted dur-
ing the preprocessing phase; then accuracy and F-Measure are obtained. Namely,
the machine-learned model built from microaggregated data is tested on a different
portion of original data.
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the results obtained from measuring the degradation of
empirical utility of microdata due to k-anonymous microaggregation. This implies
assessing the accuracy of machine learned models when trained over data microag-
gregated using an increasing value of k. Also distortion as MSE is measured in these
terms to validate its capability to estimate the practical utility of data.
Said two main results are depicted in two groups of figures for each data set:
one where accuracy and F-measure are shown and another where distortion is drawn
against accuracy to unveil their potential correlation.
Our first experiment builds on the UCI Adult data set. In this particular case,
we do not use the entire data set of more than 45 thousand records, but only 10% of
them, i.e., a random sample that preserves the prevalence of the output (confidential)
attribute. Suppressing potentially valuable data might reduce even more the data
utility after microaggregation, an effect that we are interested in studying.
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(a) Accuracy degradation
(b) F-measure degradation
Figure 4.2: Degradation of the empirical utility of the microaggregated “Adult” data set.
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Accordingly, we illustrate in Figure 4.2 how empirical utility is affected when
microaggregation is applied over the UCI Adult data set. As expected, data pertur-
bation eventually renders data useless, as shown by the decreasing trend in accuracy
as k gets higher values. Note that the lowest value in accuracy does not reach zero
since, in the worst case, when the data input (quasi-identifiers) is completely per-
turbed, machine learned models predict based only on the prevalence of classes in the
output data.
Despite this inevitable degradation in the long term, microaggregated data shows
high levels of utility even up to k = 50. Namely, for such values of k, accuracy easily
keeps greater than 80% for any of the four microaggregation algorithms evaluated.
Interestingly enough, in the case of the UCI Adult data set, this means that said
utility in terms of machine learning accuracy might be kept even when vast amounts
of data are suppressed.
Furthermore, from Fig. 4.2a, utility is remarkably preserved by MDAV with SD.
In fact, accuracy do not drop below 80%, even for k = 1000. Similar encouraging
results are obtained when measuring F-measure as illustrated in Fig. 4.2b. Besides,
we can see that the original MDAV is the second best performer in regards to practical
utility, at least up to k = 60. On the other hand, V-MDAV and Mondrian are the
worst performers, although for very few small values of k, V-MDAV gets the best
results.
When plotting the evolution of distortion as k is progressively increased, while
microaggregating the Adult data set, Fig. 4.3a confirms that MDAV with SD applies
less distortion (as measured through the combined metric proposed by [2]) than the
other algorithms. Original MDAV repeats as the second best performer, now in terms
of MSE, but Mondrian and V-MDAV seem to introduce more perturbation. In any
case, distortion grows exponentially so, according to this metric, data would render
useless very quickly. In fact, when k = 50, MDAV and MDAV with SD would have
injected more than 20% of distortion while Mondrian and V-MDAV more than 40%.
The utility metric obtained empirically may not go hand in hand with a more
syntactical measure based on MSE. This is confirmed in Fig. 4.3b where we plot
accuracy vs data distortion. The scatter plot shows that, although the distortion
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(a) Distortion measured for different values of k-anonymity.
(b) Representation of accuracy vs distortion
Figure 4.3: Distortion of the microaggregated “Adult” data set. The distortion corresponding to
MDAV with SD is measured according to the hybrid metric D proposed by [2] and presented in
2.2.6.
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increases, e.g. up to 0.5, the corresponding accuracy keeps more or less stable in 80%
for all the microaggregation algorithms. This implies that distortion, in general, is
not a good predictor of the practical utility of microaggregated data, at least in the
application domain here studied.
As described in Section 3.2.3, the results aforementioned are corroborated in ex-
periments with three more data sets. When testing the Breast Cancer Wisconsin
data set, the resilience of empirical data utility manifests again when k-anonymous
microaggregation is enforced. Once again, the benefits of MDAV with SD are evident
when outperforming the accuracy obtained by the rest of algorithms, as can be seen
in Figure 4.4. Beyond the clear superiority of MDAV with SD, it is not clear for this
data set which of the other algorithms performs the best in terms of accuracy.
Regarding the standard metric of utility (degradation), note in Figure 4.5a that
MDAV with SD also has the least distortion, that Mondrian performs the worst,
and that both MDAV and V-MDAV show a similar distortion trend. As with the
previous data set, the results of distortion hardly explain the practical utility of
microaggregated data because it can be seen in 4.5a that accuracy does not vary as
significantly as MSE when measuring the impact of microaggregation algorithms.
Figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 illustrate the results of assessing microaggregation
algorithms over the Heart Disease and synthetic data sets. For both of them, micro-
aggregation, in general, performs quite well in terms of practical utility (see Figures
4.6a and 4.8a) while distortion grows much faster (see Figs. 4.7a and 4.9a). In any
case, the original MDAV exhibits anonymized data with lower distortion and stable
accuracy, only improved by its statistically dependent variant, MDAV with SD.
We must note that in Fig. 4.7b, for values of distortion greater than 0.5 larger
values of distortion do correspond to lower accuracies, particularly when contrasting
with the results depicted in other figures. However, when distortion is lower than
0.5, accuracy is not degraded, so we feel that this behavior still fits our claim that
distortion is not a great predictor of the practical utility of microaggregated data.
Namely, accuracy is not degraded for this stretch of distortion increase. In any case,
each of the different processing techniques may definitely have a particular effect on
the intrinsic trends within a data set. Since we may not be able to model said trends,
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(a) Accuracy degradation
(b) F-measure degradation
Figure 4.4: Degradation of the empirical utility of the microaggregated “Breast Cancer Wisconsin”
data set.
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(a) Distortion measured for different values of k-anonymity.
(b) Representation of accuracy vs distortion
Figure 4.5: Distortion of the microaggregated “Breast Cancer Wisconsin” data set. The distortion
corresponding to MDAV with SD is measured according to the hybrid metric D proposed by [2] and
presented in 2.2.6.
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(a) Accuracy degradation
(b) F-measure degradation
Figure 4.6: Degradation of the empirical utility of the microaggregated “Heart Disease” data set.
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(a) Distortion measured for different values of k-anonymity.
(b) Representation of accuracy vs distortion
Figure 4.7: Distortion of the microaggregated “Heart Disease” data set. The distortion correspond-
ing to MDAV with SD is measured according to the hybrid metric D proposed by [2] and presented
in 2.2.6.
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(a) Accuracy degradation
(b) F-measure degradation
Figure 4.8: Degradation of the empirical utility of the microaggregated synthetic data set.
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(a) Distortion measured for different values of k-anonymity.
(b) Representation of accuracy vs distortion
Figure 4.9: Distortion of the microaggregated synthetic data set. The distortion corresponding to
MDAV with SD is measured according to the hybrid metric D proposed by [2] and presented in
2.2.6.
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we performed several tests on different data sets to estimate the general impact of
each protection approach.
Finally, V-MDAV and Mondrian show interesting results on these data: while the
former would spawn more distortion than the latter, V-MDAV apparently preserves
better the data utility when measured as accuracy of the resulting machine learning
model.
4.5 Discussion
Our systematic experimentation shows that k-anonymous microaggregation has a
benevolent, still destructive, effect on microdata in terms of its empirical utility,
which is measured as the accuracy of learning models built from such data. Namely,
while meeting a k-anonymity criteria, microaggregation preserves data utility even
for high values of k, as previously pointed out in chapter 3 for MDAV. This effect is
attributed to the averaging operations to find a centroid that would be denoising the
data, making it more resistant to perturbation.
In addition, although said averaging, inherent to microaggregation, might be even
convenient, the distortion metric based on MSE would measure it as utility degrada-
tion. In this sense, MSE is a pessimistic metric that, in general, is not able to predict
the practical utility of microaggregated data in this domain. As a matter of fact, not
even the combined distortion metric proposed by [2] for MDAV with SD is capable of
estimating such practical utility, despite its great performance in terms of accuracy.
The results obtained by MDAV with SD confirm that adapting privacy protec-
tion mechanisms to the intrinsic statistical properties of microdata and to the specific
application domain might open the door to interesting improvements in utility preser-
vation. This approach has not been addressed for microaggregation algorithms and
particularly for MDAV-based approaches, so there is an appealing avenue for future
work.
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The “positive” impact of anonymization algorithms is indirectly reported by previ-
ous work that accounts for, e.g., the reduced degradation of obfuscated data under cer-
tain conditions [55, 56], and the beneficial contribution to utility of some anonymiza-
tion techniques ([53]) that may act as feature selection mechanisms, particularly when
the protection strategy is selectively tailored to the application domain [58].
Accordingly, from the results depicted when representing accuracy vs distortion
along several experiments, we corroborated that distortion may not predict the prac-
tical utility of microaggregated data. Although minimum values of accuracy are
measured when having maximum values of data distortion and vice versa, as the
distortion increases, the accuracy metric does not vary in the same magnitude, even
when distortion takes values as high as 0.5. Namely, while a syntactic utility metric
indicates that microaggregated data is, e.g., 50% distorted, a more empirical utility
metric suggests that such data might be almost as useful as the original.
V-MDAV and Mondrian show, in general, a lower performance than the ones of
MDAV and MDAV with SD in terms of both distortion and accuracy. However, since
the strategies of V-MDAV and Mondrian operate on the internal distribution of the
microdata set, such results could vary according to the data set being microaggre-
gated.
Beyond the promising results, it is worth noting that our approach has inevitably
some limitations that arise, essentially, from the bounded evaluation context we have
defined . For instance, the application domain, where utility is empirically measured,
is binary classification. However, many other domains may exist where utility is
extracted differently.
Furthermore, a statistical dependence should exist between quasi-identifiers and
confidential attributes such that something can be learned and preserved when mi-
croaggregating. Evidently, if this is not the case, another utility metric should be
assessed.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have corroborated the intuition that further catching and process-
ing the statistical properties of microdata (e.g., the statistical dependence between
quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes) when building microaggregation algo-
rithms cause an additional slowdown in the degradation of empirical utility. This is
clearly evidenced by MDAV with SD through our extensive tests. Sadly, the hybrid
metric created to assess its performance is not a good enough predictor of the prac-
tical utility of microaggregated data as would be expected. However, high values of
distortion measured using such metric do suggest some correlation with metrics of
empirical utility.
Although Mondrian and V-MDAV consistently perform worse than MDAV and
MDAV with SD, the two former algorithms behave differently between each other in
terms of accuracy and MSE-based distortion. This would evidence the dependence
of their performance on the internal distribution of the data set, as claimed by their
creators. Such dependency calls again our attention to the need of considering the
application domain of data (size, exploitation mechanisms, distribution of tuples)
when designing or adapting privacy protection.
Finally, we confirmed in this chapter that k-anonymous microaggregation algo-
rithms are able to preserve much of the data utility while protecting the privacy
of each subject in groups of k individuals. Their clustering and averaging opera-
tions seem to contribute to filter, normalise, or consolidate the statistical information
within microdata, e.g., when exploiting data through machine learning applications.
Chapter 5




Modern technologies and massive access to them by billions of people have enabled
the generation of vast amounts of data. Also, more powerful and sophisticated infor-
mation systems are developed to exploit such data with the aim of getting unprece-
dented intelligence and personalization. The potential benefits of these technologies
are countless in several fields such as healthcare, advertising, and even industrial
engineering [76–78]. For most of such fields, more utility can be mined from data
to unveil qualitatively superior insight into challenges and opportunities that may
otherwise remain undiscovered [3, 4].
A compelling example of application where data utility is absolutely critical is,
undoubtedly, health and, particularly, precision or personalized medicine. In this
domain, a large data sample could reveal otherwise subtle patterns. To illustrate
this point, we recall a well-known medical experiment conducted in 1989, in which
a large number of participants in a study allowed practitioners to find out a slight
but clinically relevant effect of aspirin tablets in participants who had a myocardial
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infarction [4]. From a sample of 22, 071 individuals, the study found that heart
attacks were 0.77% less frequent when participants took an aspirin table every other
day, a phenomenon that would have been much harder to observe without such a
large sample.
Unfortunately, as explained in Sec. 2.1, exploitation of data encompasses serious
privacy risks when information is associated with individuals. Since abundant details
are usually collected about them, even after suppressing identifier attributes such as
full names, other, apparently innocuous, personal attributes (quasi-identifiers), could
still be used to re-identify an individual [23]. Thus, if a sensitive attribute were
disclosed along with other information, re-identification would enable an attacker to
associate an individual with such attribute, thus violating her privacy. But this risk
is exacerbated by the fact that data has become a core asset for companies [79], so
there is a great incentive to exploit, share, and even sell data to maximize profit.
We discussed in 2.2 that SDC is commonly used to tackle these privacy risks
when disclosing microdata files. SDC techniques build on perturbing quasi-identifier
attributes to de-identify records, a process also called anonymization. The privacy
models enforced through user data perturbation, e.g., k-anonymity [7, 11] or ε-differ-
ential privacy [12], are usually conditioned by a privacy parameter that defines an
upper bound on the re-identification risk.
k-anonymous microaggregation, as probed in chapters 3 and 4 is a high-utility
mechanism to protect privacy in microdata by obfuscating demographic attributes.
Carefully aggregating these attributes, a minimum level of distortion must be applied
to original data. In fact, on the last two chapters, we have found that k-anonymous
microaggregation is an excellent approach for applications requiring the preservation
of data utility [16].
Obfuscating data to protect privacy naturally affects its resulting utility [24].
This was briefly discussed in Sec. 2.3. Consequently, there is a trade-off that must be
addressed so that data exploitation keeps feasible and usable. In this line, the role of
SDC mechanisms is guaranteeing a given level of privacy while preserving (some of)
the utility of anonymized data.
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Also in Sec. 2.3 we addressed some ways to measure the impact of these mech-
anisms on the utility of data. In general, it has been commonly measured using
standard, but merely syntactical, metrics, such as mean-squared error (MSE). How-
ever, to capture the practical utility of anonymized data, other metrics related to its
application domain might be more relevant. Since a very common domain of appli-
cation is building machine learning models, accuracy or F-measure of these models
are reasonable metrics of empirical utility.
Aiming to find a balance among privacy and empirical utility, some research is
devoted, not only to design new less-“destructive” protection algorithms, but also to
“adapt” already existing algorithms that increase the resulting utility of anonymized
data. In this line, recent work is increasingly oriented to propose semantic (more
empirical) approaches to the preservation of data utility when protecting privacy
[84–86]. Part of this work was described in the two previous chapters.
Although utility is certainly the raison d’etre of our effort, another parameter key
to privacy protection usability is computational complexity. If protection mechanisms
cannot cope with the (sometimes real-time) requirements of modern applications, they
render unusable no matter how much utility is preserved. A few works have been
proposed recently in this direction [16, 17] and are presented in the next chapter.
In this chapter, we present and assess a strategy to preserve (empirical) utility
of data after a k-anonymous microaggregation algorithm is applied. By representing
original data in a new rotated and scaled domain, we adjust the implementation of
the microaggregation algorithm to the specific application domain of data, which in
this case is also binary classification. As a result, the error of the machine learning
model, when evaluated over new testing data, was reduced, at no cost, even for high
anonymity levels.
The anonymization method addressed in this work is computationally and func-
tionally efficient since the utility of data is preserved while the privacy level offered
by an underlying microaggregation algorithm is left intact, at no additional cost in
terms of running time.
Interestingly, data utility preservation at no (computational) cost could be a great
incentive to adopt privacy protection technologies. In fact, some big tech companies
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are turning their privacy stance into a huge competitive advantage. Thus, the compa-
nies that best adapt their operation to privacy requirements (preserving data utility
and algorithm usability) will be in better position to exploit such advantage. In this
context, these parameters could become a powerful value generator.
The work presented in this chapter is summarized in the next items.
• We develop a method to preserve empirical data utility when microaggregating
data. Namely, it is built on a practical metric derived from the application
domain of data which is binary classification in this case.
• This is done by leveraging on Linear Discriminant Analysis to find the direction
of maximum discrimination within data, which enables the microaggregation
mechanism to adapt its anonymization strategy to binary classification.
• This approach also involves weighting (by scaling) said discriminating direction
in such a way that distances in this direction are penalized when building k-
anonymous groups. The upshot is that k-anonymous microcells are grouped to
not overlap with the classification threshold.
• To give some intuition regarding our approach, we included in this work a
running example to illustrate the transformation applied to data for preserving
utility.
• We systematically evaluate this method on several data sets, both real and syn-
thetic, using different machine learning algorithms, and increasing anonymity
levels and scaling factors.
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 5.2 formally presents the
proposed formulation of our privacy preserving approach, while Sec. 5.3 presents
the experimental analysis and outcomes of this strategy. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Sec. 5.4.
The work presented in this chapter was accepted to be published in Elsevier
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence [14].
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5.2 Application of LDA to k-anonymous microag-
gregation
To explain the concept of LDA and then illustrate its application to preserving data
utility while implementing k-anonymous microaggregation, we next introduce some
principles and notation that are explained later through a running example. This
example builds on a synthetic data set, generated according to the scenario and
parameters described below.
5.2.1 Introduction to the preservation of the utility of mi-
croaggregated data through LDA
Following the scenario stated in chapters 3 and 4, we use binary classification as
the application domain since machine learning is increasingly used to exploit data.
Namely, we assume that data requiring anonymization through microaggregation will
be further processed to extract a binary classification model.
However, k-anonymous microaggregation groups records (building cells) without
considering any application domain, so both privacy protection and data exploitation
might be naturally incompatible in terms of utility preservation. Thus, our aim is
to modify this aggregation process such that it adjusts to the binary classification
algorithm while privacy is still protected.
Binary classification, in general, obtains a threshold that enables classifying the
elements of a given set that, in our scenario, consists of multidimensional numeric
points. Since k-anonymous microaggregation groups such points in cells without
any particular shape or direction, it is likely that said threshold will split some of
the cells, implying that their corresponding centroids misrepresent their aggregated
points when obtaining a classification model. In order to address this issue that would
affect the resulting utility of data, we resort to LDA.
LDA [87, 88] is a method commonly used as a preprocessing step before implement-
ing machine learning classification. It aims at modeling the difference between classes
of data by projecting a data set onto a lower-dimensional space. To do this, loosely
80
CHAPTER 5. PRESERVING EMPIRICAL UTILITY OF MICROAGGREGATED DATA
THROUGH LDA
speaking, LDA looks for maximizing the distance (separability) among the data of
different classes (their means) while minimizing the variation within each class. Such
projection enables good class separability and even a reduction of computational costs
on classification tasks ([89]) .
LDA and Fisher’s linear discriminant technique ([88]) are often used interchange-
ably, but there is a subtle difference. On the one hand, with Fisher’s linear discrim-
inant, we seek to maximize the ratio between the determinants of the between-class
covariance and the within-class covariance. On the other hand, LDA fits a Gaussian
homoscedastic mixture to the generative model via maximum likelihood estimation.
The original linear discriminant was described for a 2-class problem, and it was gen-
eralized later for multiple classes. Both methods result in the same direction of best
discrimination for the corresponding class from the multivariate observation.
Interestingly, such direction of best discrimination can be used to tailor the mi-
croaggregation process such that microcells are built aligned to such direction by,
basically, a rotation. In addition, we propose a weighing step of the records. Both of
this building blocks (rotation and scaling/weighting) aim at increasing the separability
of the two classes embedded in data to facilitate the construction of utility-preserving
microcells. Namely, our approach would be implemented before applying the original
microaggregation process, as depicted in the scheme of Fig. 5.1.




original data anonymized data
Figure 5.1: Main building blocks of our proposal to preserve utility from microaggregated data.
5.2 APPLICATION OF LDA TO K-ANONYMOUS MICROAGGREGATION 81
5.2.2 Integration of LDA into k-anonymous microaggrega-
tion
In this section we explain our proposed method in detail. We include a description on
the scope considered –in particular for data utility exploitation– and a step-by-step
illustration of the integration of LDA into k-anonymous microaggregation.
5.2.2.1 Scope and preliminary notation
As stated in Sec. 5.1, the scope of this work, in terms of data utility extraction (and
application domain of data), is binary classification. Thus, we next make a brief
description of the main elements of this scenario, the math connecting them, and the
notation that will be used along the rest of this section.
First, consider a population of patients whose attributes (e.g., height/weight) and
diabetes status are studied to build a model capable of detecting diabetes in new
individuals, based on said attributes, i.e., a binary classification problem.
Then, let x be a numeric random variable (r. v.) in Rn, i.e., an n-dimensional
vector representing these attributes for an individual. Also, let Y be a binary random
variable representing whether a patient has a diabetes condition (Y = 1) or not (Y =
0), i.e., a label. Let µ1 and µ0 be the mean vectors of the diabetic and non-diabetic
subpopulations, respectively, considering only their attributes. Accordingly, let Σ1
and Σ2 be the corresponding covariance matrices, and p the prevalence of diabetics
in this example. Finally, let
ΣW = (1− p)Σ0 + pΣ1
be the within-class covariance matrix associated to the two-class data mentioned
above. For single-class Fisher’s discriminant, there is no need to compute the between-
class matrix
ΣB = (1− p) p(µ1 − µ0) (µ1 − µ0)T .
Based on the previous definitions of x and Y , suppose a data set with n numerical
attributes, resembling n quasi-identifiers, and a binary label as the confidential at-
tribute. Besides, assume Y is to some extent predictable from the quasi-identifiers
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represented by x so the data set is useful in the realm of machine learning classifica-
tion. Accordingly, consider a generative model defined by
x|Y ∼ N (µ1, Σ)
x|Ȳ ∼ N (µ0, Σ), and
p
that builds a Gaussian homoscedastic mixture fit via machine learning estimation. Af-
ter characterizing a generic representation of the data on which our approach would
be applicable, below we describe the method for preserving its utility when microag-
gregated.
5.2.2.2 Data rotation and scaling
Our strategy for preserving data utility when microaggregating consists of building
microcells shaped in parallel to a discriminative direction and scaling data; all this
with the aim to increase the separability of numeric records when a learning model
is built. Accordingly, the following paragraphs describe the steps for finding such
direction and implementing scaling of data.
To discern between Y and Ȳ , we use a discriminative model defined by P(Y |x),




can be perfectly used as the discrimination function since it is a minimal sufficient
statistic for Y from x under this homoscedastic and multivariate Gaussian model.
If we obtain the natural logarithm of the BF (which can be seen as a unit change),
it can be finally expressed as a simple scalar product, i.e.,
ln BF =
〈





= (µ1 − µ0)T Σ−1W
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We obtain a linear discriminant function whose direction of maximum discrimination
(given that ΣW is symmetric and applying some properties of the matrix multiplica-
tion) can be expressed as
U = Σ−1W (µ1 − µ0).
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In general, for the multi-class Fisher’s discriminant, the compression matrix U con-
tains the orthonormal eigenvectors associated with the L − 1 largest eigenvalues of
Σ−1W ΣB (regarded as the solution to a generalized eigenvalue problem), where L de-






Rotation. LDA projects the data set (the part defined by x) on U , which de-
fines the direction on which the distance among the different classes of the data is
maximized while their variance is minimized. As a note, this direction can be more
efficiently calculated, e.g., in MATLAB, without resorting to the calculation of an
inverse matrix but by solving a system of linear equations.
Then, with full QR decomposition, we find an orthonormal base extension of U ,
V (an orthonormal base where one of the axes is U). This contains the normalized
Fisher’s discriminant direction. Next, the original attributes of the data set, which
are points in the Euclidean space, are represented in terms of the new axes defined
by V . Thus, we get the projection
x′ = V T x,
where x′ is a transformed version of the original attributes represented by x. The
first component of x′ is the linear combination of the original attributes that best
discriminate between the classes, while the rest can be considered less relevant.
Scaling. In line with the spirit of increasing the separability of two-class data,
we complement the application of LDA with another strategy. We propose weighting
the first transformed component, that is, first component of the LDA projection, by
a factor α ≥ 1. In this manner, distance and distortion calculations will penalize
the discrimination direction. Namely, we increase the distance among points in this
direction so that they can be more easily grouped into microcells that do not overlap
with the classification threshold. This scaling operation turns the new representation
of data into the product S V T x, for S = diag(α, 1, . . . , 1). Note that the scaling affects
the first rotated component only, and this scaling can be regarded as a multiplication
by a diagonal matrix. This product can be equally computed as (S V T )x or S (V T x),
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but if the data set to be transformed is very large, the former is much faster. Namely,
this scaling by S can be regarded as matrix multiplication and the rotation by V
can be associatively lumped into a transformation by a linear operator incorporating
both scaling and rotation, for efficiency.
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Figure 5.2: Main building blocks and theoretical operations involved in our proposal for preserving
data utility. This can also be read as the particular experimentally methodology followed for its
implementation.
To graphically illustrate the wellness of our utility-preserving methods, we next
depict their application in a simple scenario. In Sec. 5.3 we assess them experimen-
tally using real data sets.
From the scenario and generative model proposed in Sec. 5.2.2.1, assume a toy syn-
thetic dataset of 1000 records, with two numerical quasi-identifiers (say, e.g., weight
and height) x1, x2, and a corresponding binary confidential attribute y for each indi-
vidual (e.g., diabetes status). For the sake of clarity, let us illustrate the distribution
of these quasi-identifiers in Fig. 5.3, where x1 and x2 are plotted as points in two
dimensions in the Cartesian plane. Evidently, the confidential attribute y is some-
what dependent on the contribution of the quasi-identifiers x1, x2, so a model can be
learned to predict the former one from the latter ones.
If k-anonymous microaggregation through MDAV is employed to protect the iden-
tity of data owners, these points are grouped in cells of size k as graphically depicted
in Fig. 5.4. As can be seen in this figure, microcells are built considering only relative
closeness among points, so they tend to be grouped more or less equidistantly from
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Figure 5.3: Depiction of the quasi-identifiers (x2 vs x1) of our toy synthetic data set. Samples are
colored according to their class, y; blue for y = 0 and red for y = 1. The direction defined by mean
points of both classes is the direction of maximum discrimination on which data will be projected
to maximize its separability.
Figure 5.4: Microcells of samples obtained by applying k-anonymous microaggregation with MDAV
on our toy synthetic data set (k = 100). Note how the single criteria to group points in clusters is
their relative closeness.
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a centroid. This produces “thick” groups with no particular orientation in any direc-
tion. Such thickness, and the omnidirectional distribution of cells, however, makes
them more prone to fall over the classification threshold; thus, their corresponding
centroids will likely misrepresent such points when a classification model is built. This
evidently may contribute to reducing data utility.
Finding a maximally discriminative direction over which this data can be repre-
sented, LDA seems to be a convenient technique for k-anonymous microaggregation
in terms of resulting empirical utility of anonymized data. In practice, LDA will
maximize separation of data of the two classes and the inherent distortion would be
weighted by an empirical parameter α. While in Fig. 5.3 we draw such direction,
defined by the mean points of both classes of data, in Fig. 5.5 we can see the LDA
projection of the data set on this direction. Said otherwise, data is rotated and scaled
in this direction.
Figure 5.5: LDA projection of our toy synthetic data set on the direction of maximum discrimination
x′1. Scaling is also applied with α = 2.
5.2.2.3 Brief discussion
Within this new representation of data, MDAV builds “thinner” microcells in the
direction of maximum discrimination. Namely, increasing the separability between
classes will enable MDAV to tailor the shape of resulting microcells to the intrinsic
classification threshold estimated by LDA. This new distribution of cells is illustrated
in Fig. 5.6 for our toy example. There we plot the microcells built from the original
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data set, following the microcell assignment obtained from microaggregating the LDA
projection of the data set.
Since the resulting cells are clearly distributed in parallel to the intrinsic classifi-
cation threshold gotten by LDA (Fig. 5.6), it is much less likely that such threshold
falls over multiple cells. Thus, very few centroids would misrepresent data when a
machine learning model is built from microaggregated data, preserving, in this way,
its utility.
Besides preserving data utility, our method does not involve any additional com-
putational complexity since the microaggregation process is not essentially changed
but the representation of data before being anonymized. Fortunately, rotating and
scaling data to change its representation are tasks performed once and does not en-
tail significant complexity with respect to that of the iterative and complex process
of microaggregation.
Figure 5.6: Microcells built in our original toy example by using the microcell assignment obtained
from microaggregating the LDA projection of the data set (k = 100). Note how microcells are
thinner in the direction of maximum discrimination, favoring the separation of the two classes by a
classification task.
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5.3 Experimental evaluation
In this section we aim at describing the general context of the evaluation of our
proposal on preserving the utility of anonymized data. For this, we describe the
scenario assumed, the evaluation criteria (privacy and utility metrics), the tools used,
and the phases implemented.
5.3.1 Evaluation scenario
The evaluation revolves around the standard attack model in the SDC literature ([68]).
To start, we assume a microdata set that needs to be released for research purposes.
This microdata set has quasi-identifiers and a single confidential attribute. In this
case, the utility of data lies in the statistical dependence among quasi-identifiers and a
confidential attribute (such a diagnosis). In particular, such dependence would derive
in a learning model to classify other individuals, e.g., as sick or healthy. In this data
mining context, quasi-identifier records used to build the model are input samples,
while the confidential records are output labels.
Besides, due to evident privacy concerns in this context, k-anonymous microag-
gregation is applied over quasi-identifiers to protect the privacy of data subjects.
Thus, instead of original data, anonymized quasi-identifiers along with untouched
confidential attributes are released. However, the utility of anonymized data would
be undermined since obfuscating quasi-identifier records will most likely affect the
quality of statistical trends embedded.
As mentioned in previous sections, to preserve such utility, we propose using LDA
and scaling on the data as part of the microaggregation process. To assess this
approach, we test it on several data sets and compare the resulting utility with that
of data anonymized only with MDAV.
5.3.2 Data sets
With respect to the data to assess our mechanism, we used essentially the same data
sets tested in chapter 4 including real and synthetic data sets. Namely, given the
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scenario proposed in this work, two main conditions were met when selecting data, in
particular for real data sets. First, we looked for microdata sets, i.e., data containing
demographic information about actual individuals, such that a privacy concern might
be involved. Second, we required data whose confidential attribute evidenced a clear
statistical dependence on its quasi-identifiers, since data utility is measured in terms of
the capability of a machine learning algorithm to exploit such dependence. Given the
last condition, standardized data sets that do now show such statistical characteristic
were excluded.
As in chapter 4, we used four data sets: three real and one synthetic. The first
one is “UCI Adult” data set [71], standardized in the evaluation of microaggregation
algorithms but, conveniently, also employed to assess machine learning algorithms.
The other two real data sets are “Breast Cancer Wisconsin” data set [81] and “Heart
disease” data set [82], both containing medical data extensively used to evaluate
binary classification tasks. Finally, we created an elementary synthetic data set with
three attributes mimicking two quasi-identifiers and a binary confidential attribute,
in the same way as the toy example illustrated in Sec. 5.2.2.2. Table 4.1 includes
greater details of these data sets.
5.3.3 Evaluation criteria
The privacy metric we use is k-anonymity since microaggregation algorithms aim at
guaranteeing such criteria. Higher values of k imply larger anonymous microcells, so
will offer more privacy to the subjects involved. Naturally, less utility is expected
from data anonymized with higher values of k.
As described in Sec. 5.1, our evaluation scenario assumes that binary classifica-
tion is the application domain of data. Thus, the corresponding utility metric here
employed is classification accuracy, i.e., the accuracy of the classification model built
from data, whether anonymized or not. Basically, accuracy quantifies the rate of
correctly classified samples in a test set.
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5.3.4 Algorithms and tools
In order to assess the effectiveness of our approach, we used some tools that we put
together and describe next. We refer to the algorithms used for privacy protection
and utility exploitation.
As expected, the privacy protection mechanism we use is MDAV, the de facto
microaggregation algorithm. Besides its benefits in terms of time complexity, it has
demonstrated to offer interesting results in terms of distortion and classification ac-
curacy.
As in chapter 3, to measure the utility of microaggregated data, we use the ma-
chine learning algorithms that obtain the best performance, in terms of classification
accuracy, from each of our data sets.These algorithms are boosting trees (Adult) and
logistic linear regression (for the rest).
Finally, all the tests whose results are here presented were implemented with
MATLAB 2018B. This includes loading and preprocessing data, the implementation
of MDAV [27], as well as the evaluation of the resulting utility of perturbed data sets.
This evaluation implies building machine learning models over data and applying such
models over new data to measure classification accuracy and F-measure; all of this
automatized using specific embedded functions for each algorithm. Greater detail is
given in the next subsection.
5.3.5 Methodology
Next we describe the experimental methodology we used to assess the effectiveness of
our (empirical) utility-preserving approach for k-anonymous microaggregation. Fig-
ure 5.7 synthesizes the flow of the evaluation procedure, while Fig. 5.2 illustrates the
specific methodology implemented for our utility-preserving strategy.
In general, our evaluation builds on determining whether the utility of microaggre-
gated data is preserved better when LDA is considered as part of the anonymization
process. In this scenario, two main steps are carried out: anonymization through
k-anonymous microaggregation, and utility extraction through the application of a
machine learning algorithm over anonymized data. Figure 5.7 illustrates the flow of
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these steps. To assess the benefits of our LDA-based approach, then, we measure the
performance of such algorithm when LDA is used and when not.
Note that some preprocessing on the data set was necessary: numerization of some
categorical values, split of data sets to get training and test sets, and zero-mean, unit-
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Figure 5.7: Main experimental methodology followed to implement our utility-preserving privacy
protection approach on top of MDAV-based k-anonymous microaggregation.
Once normalized, the microaggregation algorithm is fed with the training set for
data perturbation. We test progressively increasing values of k to then measure the
utility degradation of data due to k-anonymous microaggregation. Figure 5.2 shows
the specific process followed to obtain the anonymized data set from our approach
proposed here. To start, the quasi-identifier values of the training set are transformed
by projecting them through LDA and scaling them by a factor α. Then, the resulting
transformed data is microaggregated using MDAV. Finally, the microcell assignment
(a vector indicating the cell to which each record belongs) from the last step is applied
on the original data to obtain the microaggregated data set, as depicted in Fig. 5.2.
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With respect to the scaling, we made several tests varying the factor α from 1
(no scaling) to 64. Then, when presenting the results, we drew the corresponding
maximum trace, i.e., the highest accuracy and F-measure values reached for each
value of k.
After the anonymization phase, we implement the utility extraction phase. This
is implemented following the same methodology described in Sec. 4.3.3. Namely,
we build a classification model from microaggregated data. Specific functions imple-
mented in MATLAB 2018b are used for training using 5-fold cross validation. Finally,
each resulting model is evaluated over the test set; then accuracy and F-Measure are
obtained.
5.3.6 Experimental results
In this section, we describe the results of assessing the performance of our LDA-
based k-anonymous microaggregation in terms of utility preservation. To this end,
we present here a series of figures where such performance was compared with that of
MDAV. As previously explained, since we addressed the empirical utility of data, the
metrics used were accuracy and F-measure of machine learned models when trained
over data microaggregated, using an increasing value of k.
To start, we assessed our approach on UCI Adult data set. In this case, we do not
use all the records but a sample of 10% of them, looking for reducing even more the
data utility after microaggregation. To keep the structure of the original data set,
we took a random sample that preserves the prevalence of the output (confidential)
attribute. By reducing the baseline utility, we thought we could better visualize the
effects of data utility preservation.
In Fig. 5.8 we depict the results of empirical utility extracted from the UCI Adult
data set after applying k-anonymous microaggregation. Note that, as expected, the
values of both metrics show a decreasing trend as the value of k increases: the impact
of anonymization eventually renders data useless.
However, as depicted in Fig. 5.8, despite the inevitable degradation, the improve-
ment, both in terms of accuracy and F-measure, is not only clear but significant in
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some cases when using MDAV with LDA. For example, when k = 50, the accuracy
of the machine learning model goes from 81.8% to 83.9%, i.e., the error is reduced
from 16.1% to 13.2%, which is a relative reduction of 18%. In the general, curves
of utility look more stable when LDA and scaling are introduced, which implies that
utility gets preserved even with relatively high values of k.
As described in Sec. 5.2, the results aforementioned are corroborated in experi-
ments with three more data sets. When testing Breast Cancer Wisconsin data set,
the benefits of MDAV with LDA are again evident. Also in this case, for some val-
ues of k, the reduction is significant. Figure 5.9 illustrates this in terms of accuracy
and F-measure. Although the results of our method are better than those of “plain”
MDAV, they do not seem as good as those obtained with the UCI Adult data set.
There are several reasons that justify this behavior. Different data sets might natu-
rally involve different macrotrends whose quality, in terms of utility, could also vary
depending even on the amount of data. In addition, learning models built from the
Breast Cancer Wisconsin data set show a maximum reachable accuracy of about 97%
(i.e., very high), while it is about 80% for UCI Adult. Thus, we suspect that, when
the room for improvement is greater, it is more likely that higher increases in accuracy
can be reached.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate the results of assessing microaggregation algo-
rithms over Heart Disease and synthetic data sets, respectively. For this two data
sets, we confirm that MDAV with LDA achieves its goal of preserving utility of mi-
croaggregated data sets better than with MDAV. Once more we verify the benefits
of our proposed mechanism but also the difficulty to do so given that MDAV already
offer a privacy preserving approach.
Even though experimenting over real data sets might be enough for validation
purposes, we use a synthetic data set with the aim to validate the results obtained
over real data.
As a last note, classical distortion metrics based on MSE does not make sense in
this study since the transformation based on LDA does not modify distances among
points. In the case of scaling points are indeed separated in the direction of maximum
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Figure 5.8: Empirical utility extracted from the UCI Adult dataset, microaggregated with original
MDAV (blue) and with LDA-based MDAV (orange). Both in terms of accuracy and F-measure,
LDA-based MDAV preserves better the utility of anonymized data.





Figure 5.9: Empirical utility extracted from the Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset, microaggregated
with original MDAV (blue) and with LDA-based MDAV (orange). Both in terms of accuracy and
F-measure, LDA-based MDAV seems to preserve better the utility of anonymized data.
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Figure 5.10: Empirical utility extracted from the Heart disease dataset, microaggregated with origi-
nal MDAV (blue) and with LDA-based MDAV (orange). Both in terms of accuracy and F-measure,
LDA-based MDAV preserves better the utility of anonymized data.
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(a) Accuracy
(b) F-measure
Figure 5.11: Degradation of the empirical utility for the synthetic data set.
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discrimination, so it is even possible that the resulting distortion in this context is
even greater than 1 although the empirical results are improved.
The results obtained by our method are encouraging in that they show a consistent
and, in some cases, significant preservation of data utility for microaggregated data.
We would like to make some points below about this matter.
First, although MDAV with LDA behaves consistently better, in terms of data
utility, than classical MDAV, the increase in utility may depend on the data set at
hand, particularly on the information it can contribute to a learning model to improve
its performance. Little could be done if machine learning algorithms cannot obtain
practical accurate models from data even before applying privacy protection methods.
Second, in practice, our proposal does not imply any modification of the iterative
process performed by MDAV. Given that our method modifies the representation of
data before being microaggregated, the resulting computation complexity remains
invariable. This detail is important because, in times when the world revolves around
big data, processing time quickly becomes a bottleneck with respect to the poten-
tial applications of large-scale databases. Moreover, domains as critical as health,
vehicular traffic, or network intrusion detection are currently using tons of data to
help computational systems make real-time, and even life-or-death decisions. Due to
such demanding requirements, privacy issues related to data processing are commonly
overshadowed. Thus, from the perspective of privacy, we feel that any improvement
in preserving data utility without a price in (computing) efficiency is not negligible
and some works are currently being purposed in this direction [15, 17]. In fact, the
next chapter presents a proposal addressing this particular issue.
Finally, we would like to point out that, since this strategy resorts to changing
the representation of data –although not necessarily its semantics–, conventional,
syntactic, utility metrics such as distortion (measured as MSE) would be hardly
applicable in this context. This fact gradually characterized syntactic metrics as less
meaningful in practical, real-word applications.
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5.4 Conclusion
Our method successfully preserves the empirical utility of data when microaggregated
through MDAV. This is done by transforming quasi-identifier values in such a way
that, after microaggregated, the resulting k-anonymous cells enable the construction
of a more effective machine learning classifier.
Graphically illustrated, our proposal gets “thinner” microcells in the direction of
maximum discrimination, obtaining a distribution of cells and reconstruction that
better preserve the statistical properties on microaggregated data. Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis and scaling were applied to find this direction and to weight the inherent
distortion by an empirical parameter α.
In terms of accuracy and F-measure of resulting machine learning models, LDA ap-
plied to MDAV outperforms the classical implementation of MDAV. Although MDAV
is by default benign when affecting the statistics within data, our approach success-
fully preserves the utility of data after microaggregation. This is confirmed trough
systematic experimentation over synthetic and real data sets.
Conveniently, this benefit comes at no cost, e.g., in terms of running time, as
other utility preserving proposals do ([90]). Thus, our approach is both function-
ally and computationally effective. Furthermore, ours is the first application of LDA
to the domain of statistical disclosure control, applying a substantial and non triv-







As we discussed in Sec. 2.1, big data is bringing new, unprecedented business op-
portunities to companies around the world. Currently, it is possible to collect and
process vast amounts of information from which more, new, better and varied cus-
tomer knowledge is mined. As a result, better decisions can be made in sectors like
health care, banking, marketing and transportation [91–93].
Despite these benefits, within such an abundance of data, it is common to find
personal sensitive information, which poses serious privacy risks. First, in the name of
this data revolution, information is more prone to be openly published or shared with
untrusted third parties. Also, although identifiers are typically suppressed, other
demographic attributes, when combined, can be used to reidentify individuals [8,
9, 23]. Thus, sensitive attributes might be easily linked to the subjects to whom
the disclosed information corresponds, which might lead to privacy risks [10]. This
scenario was described in Sec. 2.1.1.
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Statistical disclosure control aims at addressing these privacy issues in the special
case of microdata files. As stated in Sec. 2.2.1, the goal of SDC is to reduce the risk
of sensitive data disclosure while preserving the internal macro trends of data, i.e.,
its utility. Along this work, we have concentrated on k-anonymous microaggregation
and particularly on MDAV as a high-utility privacy protection algorithm.
By carefully aggregating microdata attributes, a minimum level of distortion must
be applied to data. Unfortunately, current microaggregation algorithms entail a very
high computational cost when anonymizing big data [90]. Thus, since utility extrac-
tion from big data is a priority, and already time consuming, privacy protection might
be easily neglected. That is why some works are starting to propose strategies to re-
duce the running time of privacy enhancing mechanisms while preserving the utility
of data.
In this chapter, we propose an avenues for improving the performance of MDAV,
in terms of computational time. The fundamental aim of such improvement is to
facilitate the implementation of privacy protection in big data.
The proposal allows obtaining remarkable reductions in running time by dimin-
ishing the number of operations necessary to aggregate data with MDAV, all of this
without yielding any additional loss in data utility.
This effort is interesting since the reduction of the computational cost of privacy
protection algorithms may encourage its implementation, especially when computa-
tion usually entails important economic costs for companies exploiting big data.
Furthermore, due to the massification of Internet access, the vast amounts of data
containing personal information may grow and change very dynamically, commonly
feeding online services. Then, microaggregation, in this context, is likely to be im-
plemented as an ongoing process, running as fast as possible, rather than as a static
one-time job. In fact, if data is sufficiently vast, microaggregating it once could be
unfeasible in practice for some, e.g., real-time, applications due to the quadratic com-
plexity of MDAV, so optimizing its running time in the big data era seems mandatory.
Interestingly, in this context, increasing the efficiency of privacy protection mech-
anisms (e.g., reducing their runtime) could become a powerful value generator for
companies implementing privacy.
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The work presented in this chapter was published in [15].
Chapter outline
Section 6.2 describes the adaptations applied to MDAV in order to reduce its running
time while leaving untouched the resulting utility of data. Section 6.3 presents the
results of experimental evaluation. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 6.4.
6.2 Strategies for speeding up MDAV
Our first effort towards speeding up k-anonymous microaggregation lies in analyzing
the microaggregation algorithm, i.e., in finding the components subject to be acceler-
ated, and devise the mechanisms and algebraic properties that could implement such
improvements.
As described in Sec 2.2.4, MDAV creates partitions or microcells from a data set
by aggregating neighboring records. Since MDAV operates with numerical attributes,
each record is seen as anm-dimensional point (xs ∈ Rm) in the Euclidean space, being
m the number of attributes of the data set. Note that the microaggregation process
iteratively extracts pairs of cells while 2k points or more in the data set remain to
be assigned. First, a centroid C is calculated as the average of the remaining points.
Then, from C, two points P and Q are found from the data set, which serve as
references to obtain the neighboring points of each of the two new microcells: one
formed by P with its k − 1 nearest points and another by Q with its k − 1 nearest
points. P is obtained as the furthest point from C (the maximum distance to average
vector) and Q as the furthest point from P.
The previous description reveals a set of mathematical operations over the records
of the data set. These operations mainly involve centroids calculation, distances cal-
culation, and sorting. Since these operations are used repetitively and executed over
a vast number of tuples, there is an interesting chance for improvement in the overall
performance of MDAV. Next, we describe in detail the improvements we propose on
these operations; Table 6.1 summarizes the MDAV tasks improved in this work, the
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respective strategy followed, and gives a brief description of each one. We call the
new version of MDAV as Fast MDAV or F-MDAV. In Sec. 6.3, we show the benefits
of these strategies through extensive experimentation.
Table 6.1: Summary of computational improvements for MDAV
10 Ana Rodríguez-Hoyos et al.
(total sorting) and then obtaining the first ones, i.e., the shortest, which come to
belong to the points closest to the centroid.
Interestingly, in the case of MDAV, total sorting is not strictly necessary because
the k− 1 shortest distances to the centroid could directly be chosen, without having
to sort them all first, in a process called partial sorting or selection. In the realm
of computer science, total sorting is extensively implemented through the quicksort
algorithm while partial sorting through the quickselect algorithm. The computational
complexity of the sorting task when using quickselect may be significantly reduced
from O(nlog n) to O(n) on the average case, since choosing a limited group of the
mallest distances is certainly an easier problem than sorting all the distances.
Our proposal in this paper is evidently to resort to the use of an implementation
of partial sorting (e.g., quickselect) in MDAV when the phase of microcell assignment
is performed.
Table 1 Summary of computational improvements for MDAV
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so that less operations are needed for 
microaggregation. Being these algebraic 
operations, their implementation is usually 
even optimized in multiple computing 
libraries.
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a reference, a more relaxed version called
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Since MDAV operations may not require much 
precision to build microcells, we propose 
changing the numerical representation to 
single precision so that less bits be processed, 
thus implying a reduction in MDAV’s running 
time.
3.4 Centroid by Subtraction
MDAV builds on another critical operation, centroid calculation (line 2 of Algorithm
A). At each iteration of MDAV, a centroid C is obtained to then serve as a reference
in the construction of two microcells (line 3 of Algorithm A). Every time a couple of
microcells are created, their corresponding microaggregated tuples are removed (line
6.2.1 Algebraic improvement
From line 3 of Algorithm 1, we can devise that much of the MDAV runtime is intended
to calculate distances in three moments: when finding the furthest point P from
centroid C, when finding the furthest point Q from P, and when obtaining the k − 1
nearest points from P and from Q to build two microcells.
The fact that distances between the (in some cases the same) points of a data set
are continuously calculated turns each iteration very redundant. The computation
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complexity of MDAV, then, derives from such redundancy, which we tackle through
this improvement.
Since MDAV considers each record of the data set as an m-dimensional point in
the Euclidean space, a distance Dj between a reference point x0 (which is C, P and
Q, depending on the moment) and a collection of points xj for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
calculated as a quadratic Euclidean distance, i.e.,
Dj = ‖xj − x0‖2 .
Then, to get Dj, for each m-dimensional point xj, an element by element sub-
traction (m operations) and a square norm (2m− 1 operations) must be calculated.
That is, a total of 3m− 1 operations for each point of the data set.
To reduce the resulting runtime, we consider finding an analogous expression to
calculate Dj such that less operations are performed. In this case, we harness the
polarization identity of the inner product to put the expression of Dj in terms of the
inner product of xj and x0. So we expand the last expression such that
‖xj − x0‖2 = ‖xj‖2 + ‖x0‖2 − 2 〈xj, x0〉 .










‖xj‖2 − 〈xj, x0〉 .
Although the expressions on both sides of the equation no longer represent the
real value of Dj, they are a metric still useful to compare distances since they were
summed and multiplied by a constant. Thus, when the calculation of distances in
MDAV is used to determine the furthest point from a fixed point x0, we can safely
use the right part of the last expression for comparison issues.
Conveniently, for each compared point xs, the value of
1
2
‖xj‖2 can be precomputed
once before MDAV is initiated, out of the redundant process, and avoiding significant
recalculation in every iteration of MDAV. Thus, in this case, the distance comparison
is reduced to the calculation of the inner product 〈xj, x0〉, which consists in an element
by element multiplication, i.e., m operations, and a sum of the resulting m terms,
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i.e., m− 1 operations, for each point xj. For this representation of distances, we have
a grand total of 2m− 1 operations.
By analytically operating on an expression, we get less operations than the original
expression of distance Ds. More precisely, the number of operations is reduced from
3m − 1 to 2m − 1 for each distance calculation where m is the number of quasi-
identifiers of each record in the data set.
Not only the number of operations is reduced, but they are algebraic in nature,
and that is something for which much of the current code is optimized (e.g., in Matlab
or the C standard library). Consequently, it is reasonable that Matlab uses vector-
ized code or more efficient CPU instructions, that is, advanced vector instructions
(AVX) through the Intel math kernel library (MKL). In fact, there are instructions
that compute an accumulated sum and a product, designed for the efficient computa-
tion of vector and matrix products, called multiply-accumulate operations and fused
multiply-add (FMA), which are included in certain Intel processors (e.g., Haskell). In-
terestingly, if FMA were implemented, our proposal would lead to reduce the number
of operations here analyzed to m.
In Fig. 6.1, we summarize the analysis carried out in the last paragraphs. Finally,
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Figure 6.1: Representation of the distance calculation performed for each m-dimensional point xj
when k-anonymous microcells are built. We can see that our approach Fast MDAV is able to reduce
the number of operations from 3m− 1 to 2m− 1 for each of these n records. Furthermore, since the
inner product 〈xj , x0〉 is subject to optimization if FMA is used, the number of operations could be
even reduced to m.
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6.2.2 Distance reuse
The high utility offered by MDAV comes from smartly grouping the closest points
into microcells. As already pointed out, this process certainly involves several steps
where distances need to be calculated. In this section we concentrate on steps 3 and
4 of Algorithm 1 with the aim of reducing the runtime of MDAV.
We can see that, when aggregating a microcell, given a reference point P, two
distance-calculation operations are performed. First, to find the k− 1 nearest points
to P necessary to form a microcell, the distances from all points to P have to be
calculated previously. Afterwards, the furthest point Q from P is needed to serve as
a reference for building a new microcell; this also entails calculating distances to P.
Evidently, for both steps, the calculations of distances to P can be calculated once
and reused. Here, our proposal is using the distances from every point xs to P both
to find the points nearest to P and to find the furthest point from P.
6.2.3 Partial sorting
Sorting is another time-consuming operation within the original version of MDAV. It
is recurrently implemented, e.g., to find the points closest to a given centroid in order
to establish the most appropriate members for each microaggregated cell, as posed in
line 4 of Algorithm 1.
Finding the points closest to a centroid C implies sorting all the distances from
those points to C upwards (total sorting) and then getting the first ones, i.e., the
shortest ones. Interestingly, in the case of MDAV, such total sorting is not necessary
because only the k − 1 nearest points are required. In fact, their corresponding
distances to the centroid do not even need to be ordered. Finding the k smallest
elements implies a more relaxed sorting approach called partial sorting or partial
selection.
In computer science, total sorting is extensively implemented through the quick-
sort algorithm [94] while partial sorting through the quickselect algorithm [95]. The
computational complexity of the sorting task when using quickselect may be signif-
icantly reduced, since it finds the kth smallest number in an unordered list, which
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does not require total order. This relaxation makes quickselect’s problem a much
easier one.
As expected, our proposal is to resort to the use of an implementation of par-
tial sorting (e.g., quickselect) in MDAV when the phase of microcell assignment is
performed.
Quickselect is a selection algorithm by which a single element, the kth smallest,
is found from a list. Its approach starts by randomly selecting a pivot element that
will partition the elements in two; the elements smaller than the pivot on the left
and the larger ones on the right. Then, this same approach is recursively imple-
mented only into the side where the element being searched lies up until a single
element is obtained. On the other hand, total sorting implemented through quicksort
applies the aforementioned approach on both branches, which significantly increases
the computational cost. Figure 6.2 offers a brief scheme of the extensive reduction of
computation complexity when using quickselect instead of quicksort.
By using quickselect, the average complexity of the operations in question is re-
duced from O(n log n) to O(n) on the average case. This is very convenient for a





















Figure 6.2: Brief depiction of the recursive steps carried out for the quickselect algorithm. To
find the kth element from an unordered list, quickselect starts by randomly choosing a pivot that
partitions the list into two parts: the left one with the elements smaller than the pivot and the right
one with the elements larger than the pivot. This process is is applied again only on the part where
the searched element lies. Finally, all this operation is recursively executed up until the kth smallest
element is found. The gray blocks represent the part of the data where the algorithm is not executed
(unlike quicksort), thus significantly reducing redundancy.
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6.2.4 Centroid by subtraction
MDAV builds on another critical operation, centroid calculation (line 2 of Algorithm
1). At each iteration of MDAV, a centroid C is obtained to then serve as a reference
in the construction of two microcells (line 3 of Algorithm 1). Every time a couple of
microcells are created, their corresponding microaggregated tuples are removed from
a stack (line 5 of Algorithm 1) and a new centroid is calculated using the remaining
tuples, to build other two microcells. A centroid is calculated, at the beginning of
every iteration, by averaging the remaining tuples, which simply consists in adding
up all these tuples and dividing by the number of tuples. However, in this iterative
process, several tuples of the data set get added again and again multiple times, which
definitely results in redundant work and thus running time that can be saved.
In order to accelerate the execution of MDAV, we can modify the calculation of
centroids so that the redundant operations of sum are eliminated. To this end, we
propose to calculate centroids “by subtraction”. Accordingly, we first calculate the
sum S =
∑n
j=1 xj of all the tuples of the data set (x1, . . . , xn). Moreover, we keep
track of the tuples being aggregated by adding them up in S ′ as soon as they are
assigned a microcell. Conveniently, subtracting S ′ from S has the same effect as
obtaining the sum of all the tuples not already aggregated for each iteration so said
subtraction can be used to calculate centroids as Cs =
S−S′
ns
. The benefit evidently
lays in that unnecessary adding operations are not done. Finally, note that initially
precomputing the sum of all the tuples of the data set does not represent significant
complexity since it is only done once.
6.2.5 Single precision
In computer hardware, numerical data is represented with a number of bits that define
the precision of calculations. These options include single precision, where 32 bits are
used, and double precision, which uses 64 bits.
Due to the higher computing capabilities of modern hardware, most of the al-
gorithms are implemented using double precision as a standard. However, if single
precision could be implemented, we could speedup the execution of such algorithms
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since less bits would have to be processed. Consequently, given that the standard ver-
sion of MDAV performs a series of mathematical operations over numerical values, we
propose to use single precision for them in order to accelerate the microaggregation
process.
This is the only modification that might imply a change in the results of the calcu-
lations performed by MDAV. Notwithstanding, since this algorithm might not require
extremely precise operations (in terms of the number of decimal points considered),
we expect no significant changes in the structure of microcells obtained with respect
to the original version of MDAV, but a faster k-anonymous microaggregation.
6.2.6 Prepartitioning
Prepartitioning, or dividing data into multiple chunks, is a known mechanism to en-
able, e.g., the distribution, among various instances, of the computing load necessary
to process such data. Since the execution time t of k-anonymous microaggregation
is super linear (t = n
2
k
), thus super additive, this “divide and conquer” strategy is
appropriate for reducing such execution time.
As explained in [17], the strategy consists in two steps: first, dividing the data set
in big macrocells of size K (macroaggregation) through MDAV; and, second, applying
MDAV to each of the resulting macrocells to obtain microcells of size k that satisfy
k-anonymity. The execution time of microaggregation, after applying this strategy,
is subject to be optimized based on the size K of macrocells.
The speedup reached by prepartitioning can be improved if the strategy is applied
recursively. The resulting execution time may have a quasilinear form, but at a price
to pay in terms of data distortion.
Although this approach is out of the scope of this chapter, we described it here for
the sake of illustration of the potential avenues of improvement for the acceleration
of microaggegation.
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6.3 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed computational enhancements
to MDAV. The objective of evaluation through experimentation of our approach is
mainly to determine its impact on microdata. As mentioned in previous sections,
such impact can be measured in terms of the algorithm’s speedup and the resulting
data distortion (although in this particular case it is unlikely to occur) spawned by
F-MDAV. Another objective is finding out whether such effect is independent of the
data set employed.
We conducted this evaluation across two dimensions: speedup and performance.
Speedup was measured as time gain, while performance was measured as the addi-
tional distortion incurred by the adapted versions of MDAV. However, since most
of the proposed modifications do not change the internal operations of the algo-
rithm, there was no additional distortion in the data and thus we mainly focused
on measuring speedup. Below, we describe the experimental setup and our results
from systematic tests over a variety of data sets. Such results are depicted for each
enhancement and data set in Figs. 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5, while the overall speedup is
illustrated in 6.8.
The evaluation of the computational performance of our methods was conducted
with three standardized data sets. These real data sets included “Large Census”,
“Quant Forest” and “USA House”, which were previously used in [17, 96]. The “Large
Census” data set has 149,642 records and includes 13 numerical attributes; “Quant
Forest” has 581,012 records, from which we use a random sample of 150,000 records,
and 10 numerical attributes. The “USA House” data set has 5,967,303 records and
13 numerical attributes. We used the “Large Census” data set since it is extensively
employed in SDC, whereas “Quant Forest” and “USA House” data sets were used to
validate the results obtained in “Large Census”. For our study, all attributes were
considered to be quasi-identifiers.
The experiments described in this section were run in an Intel Core i7 CPU 3.4
GHz with 32 GB RAM. The microaggregation algorithm MDAV, its adapted versions,
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and the measurement tests were implemented entirely in Matlab R2017b, where, for
the sake of fairness, we disabled any form of parallelization.
In general, all versions of MDAV were parameterized with k = 10, which im-
plies a reasonable level of privacy without incurring a significant distortion of data.
Moreover, before microaggregation was applied, we followed the common practice of
normalizing each column of the data set to have zero mean and unit variance.
To find the speedup obtained by our improvements, we measured the running
time of MDAV before [27] and after implementing our refinements. Our reference
MDAV is once again the algorithm specified in Algorithm 1. We refer to it as tra-
ditional MDAV. Furthermore, the modifications proposed in this work were applied
to MDAV individually, with the aim of measuring their separate contribution to the
speed of the microaggregation algorithm. Also, to show the combined effect of the
five improvements, we implemented them in a version of the algorithm we called Fast
MDAV.
Our experiments relied on a speedup to show how faster MDAV may become due to
the proposed computational improvements. Let t0 be the running time of traditional
MDAV and t the running time of any improved version of MDAV (including fast
MDAV). Essentially, the speedup factor s = t0
t
tells us how fast this version is with
respect to traditional MDAV. For instance, consider t0 = 15; if, after adapting the
algorithm, its running time were reduced to t = 5, we would have gotten a speedup
factor of s = 3×, i.e., an MDAV that is 3 times faster.
Regarding our experimental methodology, we have a few final remarks. First, we
assessed MDAV over a varying number of records n with the aim of verifying the
impact of our methods when the size of the data is increased. Thus, from each data
set, we extracted portions of data of varied sizes (different values of n). For each
value of n, the running time we measured was the averaged time that it took MDAV
to microaggregate n records. To that end, for every data set, we systematically
obtained 3 random samples of n records each and then averaged the corresponding
running times of MDAV. The running times for every improvement were registered
and then compared with the time of traditional MDAV through the aforementioned
speedup factor s.
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The results of our computational strategies are presented in 4 bar charts; the first
3 illustrate, for each tested data set, the speedup factor obtained by every method.
Although we experimented with several lengths, for the sake of visibility, the results
are shown only for 3 representative values of n (10,000, 70,0000 and 150,000). In
the same line, the last bar chart exhibited the speedup factor reached by the fast
MDAV, i.e., when all the improvements were consolidated within the same MDAV
implementation. Although in essence the modifications we propose to MDAV do not
imply a change in the numerical results of its internal operations, we verified whether
or not each improvement leads to a variation of the built microcells or an increased
distortion with respect to traditional MDAV.
In the following subsections, we depict and explain the results of our experiments.
Algebraic improvement
As already explained in Sec. 6.2.1, this method reduces the number of operations
needed to calculate distances by taking advantage of a property of the inner product.
Remarkably, numerical libraries are usually optimized for these algebraic operations.
Consequently, the results of our experiments show a significant speedup of MDAV
that could reach a factor of 1.54×. This is depicted in Figs. 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5, for
the three data sets we use, over which a homogeneous computational improvement is
revealed.
Figure 6.3: Speedup factor (s) of each of the five proposed improvements, i.e., when applied indi-
vidually on the Large Census data set.
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Figure 6.4: Speedup factor (s) of each of the five proposed improvements, i.e., when applied indi-
vidually on the Quant Forest data set.
Figure 6.5: Speedup factor (s) of each of the five proposed improvements, i.e., when applied indi-
vidually on the USA House data set.
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Along with the partial sorting improvement, this algebraic strategy presents the
best performance in terms of running time. In addition, the results of the cell assign-
ment function c(j) and the resulting distortion of this new version of MDAV remain
unchanged with respect to traditional MDAV.
Distance reuse
Given the recurrence of distance calculations in MDAV, its running time can be
reduced by precomputing some of such distances as theoretically explained in Sec.
6.2.2. Accordingly, after testing this improvement, when using the experimental
setup described in this section, we observe a speedup factor between 1.14 and 1.31×.
This execution performance is illustrated in Figs. 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 for the three data sets
previously mentioned.
Once again, implementing this distance reuse does not reflect any variation neither
in the structure of the microcells obtained nor in the distortion imposed to the data
sets.
Partial sorting
As described in Sec. 6.2.3, the impact of sorting operations on the running time of
MDAV could be reduced by using partial sorting, given its lower complexity with
respect to total sorting. To illustrate the potential improvements due to partial
sorting, we first performed an experiment in Matlab comparing two applications of
both problems. Although not explicitly stated in the documentation, it is reasonable
to assume that the functions sort and mink of Matlab R2017b implement variants of
quicksort (total sorting) and quickselect (partial sorting) algorithms, respectively. In
fact, this experiment confirms that these functions follow the behavior of quicksort
and quickselect in terms of computational complexity.
For this initial test, we did not only measure how long sort and mink take to
execute over a list of random generated numerical values, but we tried to mimic the
sorting operations performed by MDAV through a few simple steps: sorting real-
valued numbers and allocating and returning the indices of sorted values. It turned
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that returning indices noticeably slowed down the execution of sorting functions for
short lengths. Moreover, when necessary, we preallocated outputs to exclude the time
for memory allocation from our measurements. Particularly for the function sort, we
also considered the time of trimming off the shortest values from the list.
The test involved more than 300 experiments, each of which consisted in measuring
the time it takes to obtain the k shortest values from a randomly generated list of
length n. This process, along with the considerations of the last paragraph, emulated
the role of sorting within MDAV. To evaluate the benefits of partial sorting over total
sorting, we obtained the running times when using mink and sort functions to find
the shortest values; we tested their performance for several values of n, which ranged
from 10 to 10 million, and for k = {5, 10, 20, 50}.
For the sake of reliability, we measured the running times for several repetitions
in each experiment. Then, we computed the mean, as an estimate of average perfor-
mance. Also, while the length of the data used was the same for every experiment,
the values of the list were randomly sampled for every repetition. After a one-hour
experiment, we found that our measurements were extremely reliable: the worst co-
efficient of variation, calculated as the standard deviation divided by the mean, was
observed to be 1.63%.
Figure 6.6 shows how our experiments took longer (the running time t gets higher)
as the length n of the list increases. We used double logarithmic scales since we had
very wide ranges of values for n and t, and thus extremely low and high values
may appear. We can see that the running time for mink grows lineally with n,
regardless of the value of k used, in line with the complexity O(n) of the quickselect
algorithm; this is important evidence that mink would be implementing a variant
of this algorithm. For sort, the corresponding running times are certainly higher.
However, the magnitude of the difference with respect to mink is not very clear.
For that reason, we depicted in Fig. 6.7 the running time per element t
n
for every
experiment. Using a semilogarithmic scale, this figure does show that mink (partial
sorting) is much more efficient than sort (total sorting) since while for mink the
running time per element was constant, said time grows logarithmically with n for
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sort. As a reference, we also plotted the running time of the function min that
retrieved only the lowest value from each list.
Figure 6.6: Running time of different variants of sorting implemented in Matlab R2017b. Extensive
testing was performed for several values of n (number of elements in the sorted list) and k (here
representing the number of elements to be selected and sorted from the list, when partial sorting
was tested). For the sake of clarity, double logarithmic scales were used.
Finally, to estimate the speedup of microaggregation due partial sorting, we ran
the experiments according to the setup proposed at the beginning of Sec. 6.3, but
using a version of MDAV that relied on the function mink for microcell assignment.
We then compared the resulting running times with those of traditional MDAV that
used sort by default.
As expected, partial sorting introduced interesting computational improvements.
In fact, a speedup factor of almost 2× was reached for the Large Census data set
when n = 150, 000, as depicted in Fig. 6.2. However, the degree of improvement was
not uniform for the three data sets, as it is shown in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 for the
partial sorting method where the maximum speedup factor did not attain 1.5×. This
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Figure 6.7: Running time of different variants of sorting implemented in Matlab R2017b. Here, we
depict the time taken per element tn (t is the time taken to sort a list of n elements) to have a clearer
illustration of the remarkable performance of partial sorting implementations compared to those of
total sorting. Again k represents the number of elements to be selected and sorted from the list in
the case of partial sorting. Briefly, the running time of partial sorting remained constant for large
values of n, while for total sorting time grew logarithmically. Also, for clarity, a semilogarithmic
scale was used.
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seems reasonable since the complexity of the variants of sorting may depend on the
intrinsic structure of the data.
Centroid by subtraction
It is clear from Sec. 6.2.4 that the operations for the calculation of centroids in
MDAV are subject to redundancy since the tuples of a microdata set have to be
added recurrently to find a representative mean. Our centroid by subtraction strategy,
which uses precomputing and subtraction, obtained a speedup factor of up to 1.15×
as shown in Figs. 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. Although performance gain was more moderate for
MDAV, it was still important, considering that its implementation does not represent
any additional cost in terms of distortion.
Single precision
Being MDAV an algorithm whose calculations may not require extreme precision, our
last method is based on using single precision for the corresponding mathematical
operations. Strikingly, this modification allowed a computational improvement that
was even better than that of centroid by subtraction, i.e., a speedup factor of up to
1.35×, as depicted in Figs. 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, for our three data sets.
As anticipated in Sec. 6.2.4, the results from using this strategy showed a slight
variation in the structure of the microcells built by MDAV. However, the resulting
distortion remained unchanged.
Fast MDAV
Our last series of experiments analyzed the case when all proposed modifications
were combined in a single version of the microaggregation algorithm, Fast MDAV.
The tests showed remarkable results, as reflected in Fig. 6.8. We confirmed that fast
MDAV was up to 4 times faster than the original version and that, as expected, no
additional distortion was introduced in the three microaggregated data sets.
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Figure 6.8: Overall speedup factor s of our fast MDAV obtained over the three data sets. The five
strategies are consolidated in a single version and it is tested for several values of n. Due to space
considerations, only the results of tests for n = 10 000, 70 000, 150 000 are depicted in this figure.
Information loss with F-MDAV
As mentioned when describing each computational improvement, the rationale be-
hind the work presented in this subsection was simplifying redundant operations
when implementing MDAV. Such simplification was based on finding alternate al-
gebraic expressions, reusing and precomputing (repetitive) calculations, adapting a
more relaxed sorting strategy, and even using less precise calculations.
When single precision is used for calculations, there was a risk of obtaining a
structure of microcells different from that of MDAV. However, microaggregation did
not require extremely precise calculations since those were used only for comparing
distances between points. Namely, in practice, our proposal did not imply any modi-
fication of the resulting k-anonymous groups built by MDAV, so there might not be a
price in distortion. As a matter of fact, we verified that microcell allocation remains
invariable after F-MDAV is implemented. Consequently, our strategies did not incur
in additional distortion or information loss with respect to that provoked by original
MDAV.
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6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have addressed the problem of computational complexity of k-
anonymous microaggregation for large data sets with a substantial amount of nu-
merical records. This effort striven to obtain a more usable privacy mechanism in
contexts brought by the current big data era.
We proposed an approach with five algorithmic and algebraic strategies that re-
duced the running time of MDAV by a factor of 4, without affecting the resulting
utility of data.
This approach mainly spanned the reuse of calculations, precomputing, algebraic
modifications, and a relaxed approach of sorting; all of them were implemented in
the main tasks performed by the maximum distance to average vector algorithm,
e.g., distance calculation, sorting, assignment of microcell, and centroid calculation.
These strategies focused on the most repetitive operations, e.g., distance calculation
and sorting, lead to the highest performance.
A not negligible detail about these strategies is that can be combined with that
of other proposals without additional distortion. Naturally, said effect enables an in-
teresting opportunity for capitalizing on several of the efficiency approaches proposed
for microaggregation and, particularly for MDAV. Interestingly, these computational
improvements can also be combined with the functional (data utility) improvements
introduced by other works where microaggregation is involved [63, 97, 98].
Chapter 7
Anonymizing cybersecurity data in
critical infrastructures
7.1 Introduction
Although all the work presented in previous chapters is devoted to k-anonymous
microaggregation (in particular MDAV) and its implications on data utility and us-
ability, here we address a different anonymization approach that we used as part of
our participation in the CIPSEC European Project [13].
A different scenario was tackled where unstructured and non-numeric data needs
to be protected in terms of privacy. In particular, we refer to the security logs gener-
ated by critical infrastructures. This context poses specific challenges to the adoption
of privacy technologies, including, e.g., practical issues related to their implementa-
tion.
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are either physical or virtual systems whose opera-
tion directly supports the functioning of a society. In fact, given the wide reach of
critical infrastructures, even small problems on their operation could have a massive
impact on a vast population [99]. Besides their reach, CIs are tightly coupled with
sensitive areas such as health, telecommunications or economy, which are strategic
for a country, so their interruption might imply severe affectation for citizens [99].
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We are talking about the infrastructure of hospitals, transportation, oil and energy
distribution, banking, environment monitoring, etc. Since these services are essential
to the security, prosperity, and social welfare of the population, their corresponding
CIs must not stop working and are usually managed by governments.
Given the importance of CIs, their information systems are usually strongly pro-
tected against intrusions, mainly against those coming from the Internet. Currently,
the resources available for such protection involve “intelligent” cybersecurity solutions
that “learn” how attackers behave and ultimately detect and stop future incidents.
To do so, these solutions are fueled with so called logs, i.e., detailed information about
past events, which are stored as records describing every security incident. Further-
more, logs from multiple sources are commonly shared among several devices and
then aggregated so that more input information can improve the efficiency of pro-
tection . Aiming to ensure the continuity of their services, CIs have widely adopted
such protection mechanisms that generate very detailed and vast information about
the entities and interactions involved in security incidents.
Although more granular logs provide more intelligent security protection in CIs,
inappropriate sharing of sensitive data may rise serious privacy concerns. Cybersecu-
rity logs could include identifying attributes (IP addresses, user names, fingerprints,
etc.), strategic information of companies, e.g., about vulnerabilities, software versions,
and several other indicators (path names, user data) that, when disclosed, could easily
be used to violate the privacy of the individuals or companies involved. The risk for
privacy in this context is not only exacerbated by the increasing need of security ser-
vices to aggregate shared cybersecurity data to get improved protection mechanisms,
but also by the large number of data items enclosed in cybersecurity logs.
Beyond the security they require to protect their information systems, CIs are
more exposed to external attacks than conventional infrastructures due to a number of
factors. First, since CIs commonly serve a large population, they are desired targets of
attackers who aim at magnifying the impact of their offensive [100, 101]. Also, dealing
with strategic processes and information, CIs are usually the target of high-level
adversaries supported by powerful organizations and even governments [102, 103].
These factors aggravate even more the effects of information leakage to the point
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that, e.g., the mere revealing of internal IP addresses or user names might imply
severe risks for the integrity of such infrastructures. Interestingly then, the privacy
of companies and individuals whose information is revealed in logs may have a direct
impact on the security of CIs.
In this chapter, we present an effort to preserve the privacy of individuals and
organizations in the context of the CIPSEC framework, and particularly in what
involves the sharing of cybersecurity information. The EU project CIPSEC proposes
a unified security framework to orchestrate state-of-the-art heterogeneous, diverse,
security products aiming to offer high levels of cybersecurity protection. To do so,
this framework is able to collect and process security-related data (logs, reports,
events) so as to generate security anomaly alerts that can affect a CI health and that
can have cascading effects on other CI systems. Our proposal includes a methodology
and a tool (data privacy tool, DPT) for obfuscating sensitive data from cybersecurity
logs to protect the privacy of the involved entities and individuals.
Namely, our DTP will modify sensitive data with the aim of sanitizing or cleaning
it from too distinctive attributes. This involves applying several anonymization mech-
anisms to cybersecurity logs (suppression, generalization, pseudonymization) whose
implementation will depend on the specific anonymized attributes.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [104].
7.2 The CIPSEC framework
7.2.1 CIPSEC objectives
The main objective of the EU project CIPSEC is to create a unified security frame-
work that orchestrates state-of-the-art heterogeneous, diverse security tools and offers
high levels of cybersecurity protection in IT & OT Critical infrastructure environ-
ments. The framework is currently built to collect and process security-related data
(logs, reports, events) so as to generate alerts for security incidents that can affect
the integrity of a CI together with the potential cascading effect affecting other parts
of the CI or event other CIs. The framework aims to be very flexible, adaptable and
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causing minimum interference to the normal operations of the CI, allowing for its
easy updating when needed in a secure and easy manner.
The CIPSEC framework is capable of collecting events supported by different tools
that monitor different aspects of the CI, such as network traffic, malware threats or
wireless spectrum among others. Along with the operations for collecting events there
is also a reasoning capability based on correlation algorithms that generate alerts for
the anomalies detected in the events collected. Additionally, the CIPSEC framework
provides with additional services, transverse to the CI monitoring activity, which
complements the activities carried out:
• vulnerability tests and recommendations, including cascading effect attacks;
which allows to have a snapshot of the level of protection against cyber threats
exploiting current vulnerabilities of the assets within a CI ;
• security information sharing, leveraging the report of security incidents either
across the infrastructure or to the rest of the world, in order to, for instance,
prevent incidents propagation;
• training services, assisting on the usage of the framework and on different char-
acteristics of security management aspects, allowing for an easy training of
security staff in the context of the CIPSEC framework;
• updating and patching mechanisms, with the purpose of having a unified view
of the status of all the monitoring tools deployed in the infrastructure and
giving the possibility to automatically update them, guaranteeing the timely
protection against the latest security threats.
The CIPSEC framework was being validated in real environments using the infrastruc-
ture of three pilots that covers different domains: rail transportation, environmental
monitoring and health sector.
7.2 THE CIPSEC FRAMEWORK 125
7.2.2 CIPSEC architecture
For the sake of flexibility, the CIPSEC framework was designed to be independent
from the underlying critical infrastructure (i.e., independent from the resources man-
aged or the security requirements). The reference architecture of CIPSEC was con-
ceived based on the flow of the data managed within a CI, or, said otherwise, was
designed to be infrastructure-agnostic by design. With this aim, the architecture is
defined according to the life cycle of the security data (logs, events, reports) acquired,
disseminated and consumed in CIs.
Data Acquisition refers to the process of collecting or storing the information
(logs, events) generated by end devices devoted to secure the integrity of CIs. Thus,
there are multiple sources of this data, e.g., intrusion detection systems.
Data Dissemination covers the transmission of the acquired security informa-
tion to the components that will further process it. The dissemination of this data is
usually performed in real-time describing the multiple processes carrying out in a CI,
so that they can be monitored and controlled. In the context of CIPSEC, the infor-
mation disseminated encompasses security data related to events, alarms, updates,
etc.
Data Consumption concerns the processing of the acquired security information
after being disseminated to the relevant consumers (e.g., incident correlators). Such
information is processed and interpreted to fuel several assessment tools that enable
users to make informed decisions.
Figure 7.1 depicts the architecture of the CIPSEC framework based on a group
of layers that follow the flow of security data described above. This illustration also
shows how the security data travels from the CI to a user interface so that the system
admin can take appropriate decisions based in the processing activities carried out
by the framework, such as enforcing mitigations or applying contingency plans.
The acquisition layer obtains a lot of information directly from the CI components
dedicated such as vulnerability assessment, identity access management, integrity
management, endpoint detection and response, and cryptography. The information
collected is aggregated and processed by a component called anomaly detection rea-
soner that triggers security alerts depending on the patterns devised in security data.
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Figure 7.1: CIPSEC Reference Architecture for protecting of critical infrastructures.
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The data processing layer is on top of the acquisition layer and involves two main
components: the DPT and the forensics service. While the forensic service filters and
analyzes indicators potentially useful for forensic analysis, the DPT aims at preserv-
ing privacy in the security data coming from the CI and at storing such sanitized
data in a different database for sharing purposes. This component is the one whose
implementation we present in this chapter.
The presentation layer aggregates the information produced by the underlying
layers through a dashboard that offers a user interface where statistics and evolution
indicators are presented to illustrate the security status of the whole CI. Such interface
provides with an aggregated and uniform view of this status to the user in order to
facilitate decision-making processes.
Finally, other complementary services are also provided by the architecture in
order to guarantee the support to end users, the compliance with the CIPSEC frame-
work, and the continuity of the services.
7.3 Data privacy tool
7.3.1 Background on cybersecurity logs and privacy protec-
tion mechanisms
Logs are pieces of information that sequentially register the events affecting a system;
therefore, when seen aggregated, they constitute evidence of the system behavior.
Said diagnosis is fundamental to scrutinize and then fix a given issue, even more
in the cybersecurity realm where thousands of attackers are permanently generating
incidents that threaten the integrity of critical systems connected to the Internet.
Usually, logs contain a lot of granular information on a related event, starting
with a time stamp. Cybersecurity logs may include, e.g., IP addresses, process IDs,
hardware information and event descriptions.This information is stored in text files
formatted to guarantee its agile reading and processing. For instance, two formats
extensively used to store logs are XML and JSON. Both have interesting features
based on labels to present information as name-value pairs, e.g., “ID: 123456” or
128
CHAPTER 7. ANONYMIZING CYBERSECURITY DATA IN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
“Alarm type: critical”. Namely, the attributes or information elements of a log are
organized using a name (or label) of the attribute and its corresponding value (the
raw data). This way of representing information in logs significantly facilitates further
selection and replacement (transform) of sensitive attributes.
Roughly speaking, protecting said information against privacy threats builds on
these two operations: selection of sensitive attributes in the logs and transformation
of corresponding values to a more private version. This is more deeply described
in this document, where our proposal is presented. Although the definition of said
operations depend on the context (sharing policies, organization concerns, etc.), the
modern ways to structure logs are decreasing the complexity of performing these
operations of selection (search) and transform (replace).
First, to protect privacy, sensitive attributes (the target) must be defined and then
detected in logs. In practice, this task consists in searching for specific information in
plain text. Given the vast log data that cybersecurity systems could generate, such
searching for specific items might be daunting if it is expected to be done manually
by a human operator. Fortunately, technology can now be used to automatize the
detection of this type of attributes. Moreover, the most common logging formats are
based on labeling every single piece of information contained in the log. Thus, once
the sensitive attribute (or its label) is defined, it is not difficult to retrieve it from
the logs along with its value. If the data within logs were not appropriately format-
ted, sensitive information should be located by looking for specific syntax patterns
that such information present in logs. For instance, if IP addresses were considered
as sensitive information, the privacy protecting approach could start detecting IP
addresses in logs by resorting to its unambiguous syntax. Then, searching for a pat-
tern of four numbers separated by dots would eventually lead the system to find said
IP addresses. Regular expressions are powerful constructions that can be used to
represent and search such patterns.
After finding the attribute in cybersecurity logs, it has to be protected to pre-
serve the privacy of involved companies or individuals. This implies modifying or
transforming the value of the attribute to obfuscate any sensitive information there
contained. This task is also referred to as sanitization in the sense that it “cleans”
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data from too distinctive attributes. To do so, some anonymization or sanitization
mechanisms are commonly implemented. These mechanisms are described in the
following lines.
Suppression is the simplest strategy to protect privacy in this context. It consists
in completely eliminating sensitive information, which can be interpreted as replacing
it for a blank or any meaningless string. This implies that no trace of said sensitive
data is left which may directly affect the utility of the logs.
Generalization is rather a less destructive anonymization approach. It builds
on replacing sensitive information with more general but still meaningful data. For
instance, if the sensitive piece of data is the IP address 192.168.1.1, a generalized
version would be 192.168.0.0. In contrast with suppression, generalization could keep
some utility from the data in log records, depending on the deep of generalization
attained.
Pseudonymization is a mechanism that consists in replacing identifying infor-
mation by artificial identifiers, also called pseudonymous. Since said pseudonymous
would be used instead of the original identifier, each time the latter appears, it is pos-
sible in practice to recover the original information from its pseudonymized version.
Also, if such identifiers are only used for identifying purposes, pseudonymizing them
would not affect the utility of information.
As briefly described, the resulting utility of cybersecurity logs may be more or less
affected depending on the anonymization mechanism used to protect privacy.
7.3.2 Privacy risks from disclosing cybersecurity logs
In general, logs contain a lot of information since they are aimed at describing the
state of a system at a given point in time. Further, an aggregated set of logs should
enable an administrator to have a general view of the performance of said system. In
particular, the specific amount of data items (we call them attributes) present in a log
record will depend on the level of granularity set in the logging service. Interestingly,
some equipment, e.g., networking devices, allow to be configured with such high levels
of granularity that manufacturers explicitly warn about the risk of saturating storage
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or processing resources. Thus, logs could become extremely detailed pieces of data
describing a system where companies and individuals are involved.
Cybersecurity logs might include very sensitive data since they are commonly
associated with vulnerabilities and security threats. If that information fell into the
wrong hands, it could cause severe damage to the data owners. Besides, the level
of granularity of security logs is usually higher to afterwards enable the detection of
security breaches (which use to be provoked by undercover interactions), so more and
more attributes are included in logs to improve protection to the same extent. As
a consequence, the potential leakage of this information implies serious privacy risks
for the entities involved, not only due to the weaknesses that such logs could reveal
to attackers, but also due to the increased detail of the information.
Ironically, the risk of leaking this information does not necessarily come from de-
liberate attacker intrusions to steal it, but from the voluntary release of such logs
when sharing them to other partners. In fact, sharing cybersecurity logs has become
a common practice among organizations as a collaboration mechanism to enhance the
effectiveness in detecting and preventing security threats. The attributes characteriz-
ing a security incident in a system, e.g., IP addresses, file names, sizes, can be shared
with system administrators with the aim to help other systems detect or prevent
related threats. More specifically, information sharing enables sharing partners to
enhance their defensive capabilities, i.e., detecting, responding, and recovering from
cybersecurity incidents. As a matter of fact, the collective aggregation of shared secu-
rity logs is currently the main input fueling powerful antivirus and network security
devices.
Despite the great benefits that sharing cybersecurity logs may bring, some chal-
lenges still remain. One of said challenges is safeguarding sensitive information that
might be included in these logs, i.e., protecting the privacy of the entities whose infor-
mation is shared. The violation of privacy in this context (e.g., due to the disclosure
of personally identifiable information) may have serious consequences, particularly
for companies, such as financial loss, legal action, loss of reputation, and exposure to
protection capabilities.
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As explained above, the nature of cybersecurity information contained in logs is
inherently sensitive since it includes several attributes and also some very punctual
data items that may reveal strategic operations of systems regarding their security.
Virtually every computing device and application are enabled to generate this type
information, especially if they engage networking or web interactions. Some examples
of sensitive information that could be included in cybersecurity logs are described
next.
Timestamp. A time stamp is fundamental to determine the moment when a
security incident occurred. The exact date and time of the incident allow to correlate
other events that could contribute on the investigation of the threat. However, if
coupled, e.g., with individuals, temporal data could also help attackers perform the
same correlation to unveil patterns (a person’s sleep time, a company’s patching
calendar) to violate privacy.
IP address. IP addresses individuate devices so that security issues can be
associated with the entity where the incident has been generated. Nevertheless, in
the same line, IP addresses are key information for privacy attackers to identify
the individuals and companies involved. In fact, an IP address could unequivocally
represent an individual or a family, so the security logs related to their interactions
would reveal such tight association. The mere availability of this information enables
further security attacks (denial of service, fingerprinting) to companies, which could
reveal even more indicators about potential victims (privacy violations).
IP addresses are not the only data items with this individuating capability. Other
attributes that may appear in security logs such as user names, host names and
MAC addresses have similar identification capabilities, although their presence is not
as common as IP addresses. There are also apparently innocuous indicators that
are contained in cybersecurity logs that can serve as identifying parameters when
combined, e.g., software version and patch level information, hardware information,
system event, file access, etc. Interestingly, the resulting combination of said at-
tributes can be seen as a fingerprint of the associated entity and could be used as an
identifier by itself.
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Table 7.1: Some attributes whose disclosure in cybersecurity logs might jeopardize privacy.
Attribute Privacy risk
IP address May enable identification of users and organizations.
e-mail address May enable identification of users and organizations.
path names Could disclose user names, directory hierarchies.
patching information Could reveal software updating calendars, thus when
software versions Along with other attributes, could enable fingerprinting and identification of users.
incident description When associated with an origanization, could unveil its vulnerabilities.
organization name May allow attackers to identify an organization.
Any indicator or attribute included in logs could reveal further sensitive infor-
mation. The specific privacy risk, however, depends on the context, i.e., on the
background information available for the attacker, and his objective, but also on the
particular status of the potential victim. For example, path names could disclose
information about the work a user might be performing, or operating system and
patches names may reveal the preferences of a company regarding their network or
software implementation (which it had been keeping secret). Disclosing such infor-
mation in logs that will be shared may represent a privacy violation for users or the
company whether or not the parameters included are critical for each entity.
Besides identifying attributes or other complementary indicators, the information
included in cybersecurity logs may be very specific when generated by specialized de-
vices such as routers, antivirus servers, intrusion protection systems, forensic toolkits,
SIEMs (security information and event management systems), etc. Moreover, these
logs contain very critical information since it is commonly derived from assessment
routines, i.e., contemplates “refined data” (which in practical terms implies more and
more valuable data). This information might span vulnerability alerts, system arti-
facts, attack alerts, or summary reports, whose disclosure is a direct threat for the
privacy of the entities involved.
The risk to privacy when sharing cybersecurity logs is seriously exacerbated when
CIs are involved since the corresponding entities and their workers are more exposed
given the strategic role they are playing. In Table 7.1, we describe some attributes
whose disclosure in cybersecurity logs may imply serious privacy risks.
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7.3.3 Architecture of the data privacy tool
The objective of our DPT is offering privacy for individuals and institutions in a
context where cybersecurity logs have to be shared among different partners. While
disclosing and aggregating such data may improve the capabilities of security solu-
tions in CIs, the high granularity of logs and the sensitive attributes there contained
may jeopardize privacy. Thus, we devise a tool to protect this sensitive data by
anonymizing it. This tool encompasses the components described below.
7.3.3.1 Target description
The first step in protecting privacy in cybersecurity logs is determining the set of
sensitive attributes that will have to be sanitized. Said otherwise, the specific target
of the anonymization mechanisms has to be defined since logs use to hold a lot of
information.
The level of sensitivity, however, depends on the specific context in which users
and companies perform (their interests, needs, worries, adversaries, etc.). Moreover,
although some attributes might be defined as sensitive by default (e.g., identity num-
bers), or automatic mechanisms could be created to “recognize” them, the operators
of the DPT should always have the last word when deciding what attributes to protect
by defining a privacy policy.
Evidently then, to locate sensitive attributes and their values within the data
provided by logs, some language might be necessary for the user to describe the
corresponding targets. If logs were generated by CIs without any visible structure,
patterns should be found to detect the sensitive attribute, e.g., looking for quartets
of decimal numbers separated by dots to find IP addresses (which the operator would
have defined as sensitive). Fortunately, to facilitate its exploitation and analysis, logs
are commonly generated in structured formats, sometimes even in hierarchical trees,
such that the information be organized according to certain logic and that every
attribute value is labeled.
As logs are presented through standard approaches and attribute values are in-
dexed through labels, it is straightforward to refer to such attributes to then retrieve
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their values. For instance, let us suppose that the operator is interested in preventing
individuation of his company in the logs generated by their devices. Thus, he might
have to detect identifying data in logs, such as IP addresses, to anonymize them and
protect privacy. There may be different approaches to search for IP addresses in a
log, as described below.
• By keyword. Within cybersecurity logs, IP addresses are usually labeled with
a keyword such as SRC IP (source IP) or DST IP (destination IP) or any other.
Knowing such keyword, it is pretty easy to obtain the sensitive value associated
in the corresponding log.
• By pattern. If the sensitive data to be anonymized is not systematically
associated with an index or label, a pattern could be used to look for such data.
In the IP address example, e.g., we could look for any group of four numbers
from 0 to 255 separated by dots, which could be symbolically represented as
X.X.X.X.
• By value. Still in the case when no specific keyword is available, the value of
the sensitive attribute could be directly searched in logs. The drawback of this
approach is evidently that this search spans a single value while the first two
may encompass a wider spectrum of values.
Since the first step to protect privacy in cybersecurity logs involves searching for
a string (keyword, pattern or value) in a piece of text, it is worth noting that, at
an implementation level, the use of regular expressions is highly recommended for
such tasks. See Figure 7.2 where this component of target description of our DPT
is depicted as it would work with the other two components described in the next
subsections.
7.3.3.2 Context definition
As stated in the previous section, the sensitivity of some data item is subject to the
context where its owner performs. In the same line, the privacy protection mechanism
required will vary according to the specific needs and characteristics of the subjects
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Figure 7.2: Architecture of the data privacy tool.
involved. The context-definition component then enables the user of our DPT to set
any restriction or condition on the application of the privacy protection strategy.
While a lot of restrictions could be integrated, there is one in which we are in-
terested for the CIPSEC framework. Since three different pilots or organizations are
sharing their cybersecurity logs, the user of the DPT could opt for anonymization or
not depending on the organization he belongs to. For instance, air quality monitor-
ing might not involve sensitive attributes for the organization generating such data so
could decide not anonymizing their data. Other more complex scenarios may be char-
acterized, e.g., by a company having very specific needs on anonymizing attributes
that in other contexts might not be critical to protect. In brief, the scope in which
our DTP is used may also define the operation of the DPT.
In Figure 7.2, we illustrate this component within the whole architecture of this
tool.
7.3.3.3 Transformation
Once sensitive information and context are defined, sensitive data has to be trans-
formed in order to protect privacy. Said transformation implies perturbing attribute
values so that, e.g., identifiers no longer serve to identify individuals, or that sensitive
values provide less specific information regarding individuals or companies.
136
CHAPTER 7. ANONYMIZING CYBERSECURITY DATA IN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
The transformation component in the architecture of our DPT is implemented
through the anonymization mechanisms described in Sec. 7.3.1. As explained above,
such mechanisms will replace the original sensitive value with another (at least less
specific) string. Figure 7.2 shows how this component is integrated in the architecture
of our DPT.
It is worth noting that when transformation has to be done dynamically (i.e.,
when replacing according to a a predefined pattern), regular expressions are also very
useful as with target description.
7.3.3.4 Privacy policies
In order to enable users to set the context of their privacy protection, a privacy policy
has to be defined. A privacy policy is essentially a list of named rules that include
the parameters that characterize the anonymization of sensitive information, i.e., the
description of the specific attribute to be anonymized, the transformation mechanism
to use, and any other criterion (e.g., the organization whose logs will be anonymized).
7.4 Implementation and Integration in the CIPSEC
framework
As explained throughout this chapter, cybersecurity logs enable the intelligent pro-
tection provided by the CIPSEC framework. Meanwhile, our DPT aims at preserving
the privacy of individuals and organizations involved in such logs when shared among
different partners. All the logs generated by several security devices in the CIPSEC
infrastructure are aggregated and formatted in standard JSON format in real time to
then be stored in a security information and event management server (XL-SIEM).
Figure 7.3 depicts a sample of these logs that are further available for sharing in a
Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP).
As mentioned in Section 3, our DPT has three main inputs that guide the anonymiza-
tion process: the cybersecurity logs that are fueled by the XL-SIEM; a privacy policy,
also as a file formatted in JSON (an example is depicted in Figure 7.4); and a scope
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Structure of the log
{'AlarmEvent’: {
'USERNAME': '', 'SRC_IP': '188.112.63.117', 'BACKLOG_ID': 
'839301cfd5b54179847535ffa3e29adc', 'DATE': '2018-07-17 
09:00:16’, 
'DST_IP': '84.88.67.117', 'USERDATA7': '', 'USERDATA6': '', 
'FILENAME': '', 'PRIORITY': 4, 'RELIABILITY': 10, 
'ORGANIZATION': ‘hospital', 'SENSOR': 
'AD14C6F3975ED9860E32190EA3DF2535', 'SID_NAME': 
'directive_event: Detected access to SAMBA in Honeypot', 
'USERDATA2': '', 'USERDATA3': '', 'USERDATA1': 'tcp', 
'PROTOCOL': 6, 'RISK': 4, 'USERDATA4': '', 'USERDATA5': '', 
'EVENT_ID': '04447d36c0614e3fbe70b5b4612adf2e', 'USERDATA8': 
'', 'USERDATA9': '', 'PLUGIN_NAME': 'cyber-monitor', 
'DST_IP_HOSTNAME': '00000000', 'RELATED_EVENTS': 
'[899f11e885a4080027ea052cd289c2dc,899f11e885a4080027ea052cd2
b27c90]', 'PASSWORD': '', 'PLUGIN_SID': '2', 'CATEGORY': 
'Recon', 'SRC_IP_HOSTNAME': '00000000', 'SUBCATEGORY': 
'Scanner}
Figure 7.3: Sample of logs generated by the CIPSEC framework.
























Figure 7.4: Sample of policies defined in JSON format.
that indicates the organization that is executing the anonymization process. The
latter argument enables the user to anonymize only the logs that belong to his orga-
nization. After logs are anonymized, they are sent to the MISP for sharing purposes.
Finally, for the sake of usability, the control of the execution of the DPT and the
selection of the privacy policy is delegated to a graphical user interface integrated in
the dashboard of the CIPSEC framework. Figure 7.5 illustrates the components men-
tioned in this section and their corresponding interactions, while Figure 7.6 shows how
a single anonymized log record would look. As a side note, our DPT is implemented
using Python.
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Before and after Anonymization
Figure 7.6: A view on how the privacy in cybersecurity logs could be protected through different
anonymization mechanisms.
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7.4.1 Related work
The concerns on the privacy risks from cybersecurity data are not new. The Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) of the USA already reports in [105] how the
advances in technology have given rise to important challenges to ensure the privacy
of personally identifiable information. The GAO recommends implementing privacy
practices to protect personal identifying information, especially when managed in
critical infrastructures. But in a wider scope, severe regulation is currently been ap-
plied in the USA and Europe [106] to protect privacy at every context, essentially
by given users great control over their data. Though these documents acknowledge
the increasing need to protect privacy, they are regulatory approaches that require
implementation according to the specific domain.
Several approaches can be found in the literature that describe privacy preserving
mechanisms on unstructured data (e.g., any type of log data). Those mechanisms are
based on sanitization (through suppression, generalization, or any kind of perturba-
tion) of such data. Some works address related mechanisms [107], not only focused on
protecting privacy but also on preserving the utility of sanitized data [108]. Interest-
ingly, some of such approaches even consider the semantics of the text to be sanitized
to get more efficient mechanisms [109, 110]. Unlike those works, our approach fo-
cuses on privacy preserving within cybersecurity data in the particular context of the
CIPSEC framework.
With regards to the exchange of threat information several initiatives are ex-
ploiting their possibilities. For example, the DiSIEM project (a) uses it to empower
Security Information and Event Management systems by exporting and importing
data about incidents detected, allowing for the update of detection rules according to
the information imported. DiSIEM also uses MISP as platform for the exchange of
information although the privacy considerations are something not considered so far.
(a)DiSIEM project web page: http://disiem-project.eu/
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7.5 Conclusions
Cybersecurity data generated in the form of logs is very prone to including sensitive
information about individuals and organizations, even more so when such logs be-
long to CIs. The strategic importance of such data, then, makes those individuals
and organizations common targets of privacy adversaries. The EU project CIPSEC
integrates the cybersecurity information systems of three CIs to improve their threat
detection and reaction capabilities. However, since this integration involves sharing
such cybersecurity data, there are privacy risks that must be tackled.
The solution we propose addresses this issue by pre-processing logs to anonymize
sensitive attributes according to a privacy policy that defines a particular context.
Enabling users to set privacy policies is definitely the most important and compli-
cated task since many factors have to be considered to define not only what data
to anonymize, but also when and how. Fortunately, the logs generated by informa-
tion systems are currently represented using more structured and flexible formats
(e.g., JSON), which, along with the power of regular expressions to define context,
significantly facilitate matching and dynamically perturbing string-based attributes.
As a work in progress, there are several avenues to enhance our privacy tool.
Perhaps the most important pending work has to do with assessing the impact of
the anonymization mechanisms on the practical utility of cybersecurity logs. Un-
doubtedly, data perturbing strategies reduce the quality of the information involved
so a balance must be reached to protect privacy while minimizing utility loss. More-
over, standardization of the definition of privacy policies is necessary to simplify the
configuration of the anonymization mechanisms. This could be a daunting task so au-
tomating it according to the requirements of users and organizations might certainly
help. Furthermore, a challenge in data sanitization is the reidentification risk posed
by inferences based on several attributes exploited simultaneously. Finally, in the
same line, more usable (probably graphical) interfaces could be developed to enable
end users to provide the parameters of a personalized context in order to better guide
the anonymization process of cybersecurity logs.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
8.1 Conclusions
Privacy protection implemented as data perturbation inevitably degrades data util-
ity, more if privacy requirements are stricter. This has been shown through several
experiments along this work. However, this evaluation could be relative since there is
not a single way to evaluate data utility. Thus, selecting the most appropriate metric
is crucial to have a truthful evaluation.
To address this issue, we have presented a methodology to systematically evaluate
the impact of privacy protection, particularly of k-anonymous microaggregation, on
the empirical utility of data. Assuming machine learning as a popular application
domain of data, we have used the accuracy of resulting learning models as a metric
of the utility of microaggregated data.
We have found that the default operation of some k-anonymous microaggregation
algorithms (MDAV) may not affect empirical data utility significantly. We have ar-
gued that the clustering implemented by microaggregation may be acting as a form
of averaging and thus denoising. This denoising effect, akin to averaging through
clustering, may be the underlying cause of the striking utility of k-anonymous micro-
aggregation.
Although the empirical utility metric we have employed (accuracy) shows a monoto-
nous relationship with MSE, the traditional utility metric of SDC, the latter is not an
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ideal metric to determine the impact on the utility of microaggregated data. These
results have been corroborated with various algorithms.
When evaluating different microaggregation approaches, we have confirmed the
intuition that processing the statistical properties of microdata when building micro-
aggregation algorithms cause an additional slowdown in the degradation of empirical
utility. This suggested that, although microaggregation was a high-utility approach,
there were some space for improvement. In any case the dependence of the perfor-
mance of microaggregation algorithms on the internal distribution of the data set was
also evidenced.
Beyond the evaluation of k-anonymous microaggregation in terms of the applica-
tion domain of data, we have proposed a mechanism to preserve its inherent empirical
utility. Applied to MDAV, this mechanism has successfully preserved data utility by
transforming quasi-identifier values so that the resulting k-anonymous cells enable
the construction of a more effective machine learning classifier. Linear Discriminant
Analysis and scaling were used as a preprocessing step to transform data such that
microaggregation builds a distribution of cells that produces a more accurate learning
model.
In terms of accuracy, LDA applied to MDAV outperformed the classical imple-
mentation of MDAV. Interestingly, this comes at no cost in terms of running time.
Thus, this solution results both functionally and computationally effective. As the ef-
forts presented in next chapters, this proposal was implemented on MDAV but could
be applied on other k-anonymous microaggregation approaches.
Besides the natural interest in preserving data utility, the run-time overhead of
privacy mechanisms should be low to encourage its adoption in practice, particular
when large data sets are involved. If a privacy technology hinders the operation of
a service, it will most likely be discarded. Unfortunately, utility preservation usually
comes at a price in computational cost, which implies an additional trade off between
utility and running time. Then, beyond the primary objective of privacy, there is
an important challenge that has to do with the usability of related mechanisms, i.e.,
with its feasibility to be implemented and used in practice.
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We have addressed this issue by proposing a method for speeding up the execution
of MDAV. This included algorithmic and algebraic strategies that reduced the running
time of MDAV by a factor of 4. This was done by simplifying the internal operations of
MDAV, without affecting the resulting utility of data. Conveniently, these strategies
can be combined with those of other proposals, provoking a multiplicative effect,
without additional distortion.
In times when the world revolves around big data, processing time quickly becomes
a bottleneck with respect to the potential applications of large-scale databases. More-
over, domains as critical as health, vehicular traffic, or network intrusion detection are
currently using tons of data to help computational systems make real-time, and even
life-or-death decisions. Due to such demanding requirements, privacy issues related to
data processing are commonly overshadowed. Thus, from the perspective of privacy,
we feel that any improvement in (computing) efficiency is not negligible, particularly
when the strategy does not entail additional data distortion, and even more when its
multiplicative effect may turn a privacy mechanism feasible for a critical application.
Finally, we have explored the anonymization of unstructured data in the form
of logs through a practical implementation. In particular, we have presented a tool
that preprocesses cybersecurity data to protect the privacy of the entities involved
in such logs. Since sensitive information could be released in security logs, this tool
anonymizes sensitive attributes, that are further shared, according to a privacy policy
that defines a particular context.
The design of the tool enables users to built this policy by considering many factors
that describe a particular context. This includes defining what data to anonymize,
when and how. This was an interesting practical exercise that evidenced some of
the issues of implementing a privacy tool beyond the general assumptions, e.g., with
respect to the structure of data.
8.2 Future work
In chapters 3 and 4 we performed a systematic analysis of the impact of k-anonymous
microaggregation on the empirical utility of data. Assuming machine learning as the
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application domain of data, we used the accuracy of learning models as a utility
metric.
These considerations paved the way for future work on improving the performance
of microaggregation algorithms. For instance, other anonymization algorithms could
be assessed under these conditions to test their behavior when empirical utility is mea-
sured. However, some of their reconstruction techniques, e.g., using other than nu-
merical representations for microaggregated data, could complicate the measurement
of utility when the application domain is machine learning, so further assumptions or
preprocessing should be done.
Additionally, it is worth exploring adaptations or novel contributions for privacy
protection that exploit to the maximum the statistical properties of all the information
available within microdata. Intuitively, it seems that some of the strategies available
for machine learning could be used to preserve the utility of microaggregated data.
In Chapter 5, we presented our proposal on preserving data utility when microag-
gregating data using MDAV. We leveraged on a machine learning technique called
LDA which was applied on two-class data, i.e., for binary classification. Further re-
search in this direction could involve the generalization of this method to address
multi-class classification and not only binary classification scenarios.
More generally, it might be interesting to study other machine-learning-based
models as mechanisms to represent and microaggregate data to reduce the distortion
introduced to variables, combination of variables, or directions that contribute to a
more accurate classification. This mainly implies exploring adaptations or novel con-
tributions for privacy protection that exploit to the maximum the statistical prop-
erties of all the information available within microdata. This work confirmed the
intuition that some of the strategies already available for machine learning could be
used to preserve the utility of microaggregated data.
In Chapter 6, we explored a promising mechanism to reduce the running time of
k-anonymous microaggregation, particularly on large data sets. The assessment of
our proposal is limited in the sense that it is implemented only on top of MDAV, as
well as the aforementioned approaches.
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Finally, in Chapter 7 we presented the design of a privacy tool for anonymizing
sensitive attributes in unstructured data. As a work in progress, there are several av-
enues to enhance this privacy tool. Perhaps the most important pending work has to
do with assessing the impact of the anonymization mechanisms on the practical utility
of cybersecurity logs. Undoubtedly, data perturbing strategies reduce the quality of
the information involved so a balance must be reached to protect privacy while min-
imizing utility loss. Moreover, standardization of the definition of privacy policies is
necessary to simplify the configuration of the anonymization mechanisms. This could
be a daunting task so automating it according to the requirements of users and orga-
nizations might certainly help. Finally, more usable (probably graphical) interfaces
could be developed to enable end users to provide the parameters of a personalized
context in order to better guide the anonymization process of cybersecurity logs.
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